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Summary 
Like many other international human rights law instruments, the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was written from a male 
perspective, which has resulted in that the refugee definition of the 
Convention historically has been interpreted through a framework of male 
experiences. For this reason, many asylum claims of female applicants have 
been ignored. 
 
In order to be granted refugee status, the applicant must show that the reason 
why he or she is at risk of persecution is related to one or more of the 
established persecution grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion 
or membership of a particular social group. A person who risks gender-related 
persecution, meaning persecution which is fully or partially based on notions 
of gender, must be able to show that the persecution in question can be 
considered to fall within the ambit of the persecution grounds. In the course 
of this, the persecution grounds must be interpreted in a gender-sensitive 
manner.  
 
This thesis examines the consequences of how the persecution grounds of the 
refugee definition are interpreted and applied to encompass gender-related 
persecution. This is done by investigating how gender-related persecution has 
been included in international and national law in the interpretation and 
application of the persecution grounds; how these instruments, in their 
approach to encompass gender-related persecution, correspond to each other; 
and which feminist critiques these legal instruments answer to or remain 
sensitive to.  
 
The research questions are divided into three categories. The first category 
concerns the legal examination of international and national law. The legal 
instruments that are examined are the 1951 Convention, CEDAW and the 
Swedish Aliens Act. The second category has to do with the correspondence 
between these legal instruments. The third category relates to how the law, in 
its interpretation and application of the persecution grounds, answers to 
and/or remains sensitive to different categories of feminist critique of refugee 
law identified by Thomas Spijkerboer.  
 
According to the UNHCR, the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention 
covers gender-related persecution if properly interpreted, even though “sex” 
or “gender” are not included as persecution grounds. The UNHCR also states 
that each of the persecution grounds must be considered in gender-related 
claims and that they all have to be interpreted in a gender-sensitive manner. 
Although all of the persecution ground may be applicable in cases where 
someone risks gender-related persecution, it is “membership of a particular 
social group” that often is applied to these cases, much due to the fact that 
women may be considered to constitute a social group within the meaning of 
the Convention. The statements of the UNHCR have been echoed by the 
 2 
CEDAW Committee. The Committee has also expressed that it is in 
accordance with CEDAW to add an additional ground, such as sex, into the 
national legislation in order to encompass gender-related persecution. 
 
In 2005, the term kön was included into the Swedish refugee definition in 
order to adapt the Swedish Aliens Act to the international interpretation of 
“membership of a particular social group”. Swedish preparatory works also 
echo the statements of the UNHCR. They explicitly state that all of the 
persecution grounds, and not only “membership of a particular social group”, 
may encompass gender-related persecution and that they all should be 
considered, in no particular order, when an applicant claims that he or she is 
at risk of persecution for reasons of kön. However, the intentions of the 
legislator have not been followed by the Migration Court of Appeal. The 
Court only considers kön under “membership of a particular social group” in 
cases involving gender-related persecution and does not bring up the potential 
relevance of the other persecution grounds. Hence, the Swedish judicial 
application of the persecution grounds is not in accordance with the Aliens 
Act, the 1951 Convention and CEDAW.  
 
This thesis also shows how the interpretation and application of the 
persecution grounds can be criticised from a feminist perspective. The 
interpretation and application of the persecution grounds of the 1951 
Convention and the Aliens Act and the obligations identified by the CEDAW 
Committee mostly answer to the human rights approach, since the ground 
“membership of a particular social group” has been emphasised and there is 
a tendency to highlight the cultural context from which refugee women come. 
This approach is sensitive to the anti-essentialist critique, which means that 
the emphasis that is given to “membership of a particular social group” leads 
to a reinforcement of the view that only men can be considered as “real 
refugees” and sustains the stereotype that the persecution grounds that are not 
explicitly “gendrified” are meant for male applicants. The anti-essentialists 
opposed the emphasizing of the cultural context because it demonises the 
Third World and reproduces the distinction between the Western and the non-
Western countries. However, there are indications of that there is a movement 
towards a more anti-essentialist thinking, especially within the CEDAW 
Committee. This, since the emphasis that has been given to the ground 
“membership of a particular social group” in gender-related claims has been 
recognised as being problematic.   
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Sammanfattning 
Liksom flera andra internationella instrument för mänskliga rättigheter skrevs 
1951 års flyktingkonvention från ett manligt perspektiv, vilket har resulterat 
i att flyktingdefinitionen i konventionen historiskt sett har tolkats utifrån 
manliga erfarenheter. På grund av detta har flera asylansökningar av 
kvinnliga sökanden blivit ignorerade.  
 
För att erkännas flyktingstatus måste den sökande visa att anledningen till 
varför han eller hon riskerar förföljelse går att hänföra till en eller flera av 
förföljelsegrunderna: ras, religion, nationalitet, politisk åskådning och 
medlemskap i en särskild samhällsgrupp. En person som riskerar att utsättas 
för könsrelaterad förföljelse, det vill säga förföljelse som helt eller delvis 
bygger på föreställningar om kön, måste kunna visa att förföljelsen i fråga 
kan anses falla inom tillämpningsområdet för de etablerade 
förföljelsegrunderna. Detta kräver att förföljelsegrunderna tolkas på ett 
genusmedvetet sätt.   
 
I denna uppsats undersöks konsekvenserna av hur förföljelsegrunderna i 
flyktingdefinition tolkas och tillämpas för att omfatta könsrelaterad 
förföljelse. Denna undersökning utförs genom att studera hur könsrelaterad 
förföljelse har inkluderats i internationell och nationell rätt i tolkningen och 
tillämpningen av förföljelsegrunderna; hur dessa instrument, i deras 
tillvägagångssätt för att omfatta könsrelaterad förföljelse, motsvarar 
varandra; och vilken feministisk kritik dessa instrument besvarar eller är 
känslig för.  
 
Frågeställningarna är uppdelade i tre kategorier. Den första kategorin avser 
den rättsliga undersökningen av internationell och nationell rätt. De rättsliga 
instrument som undersöks är 1951 års flyktingkonvention, CEDAW och 
Utlänningslagen. Den andra kategorin behandlar hur dessa rättsliga 
instrument överensstämmer med varandra. Den tredje kategorin berör hur 
lagen, vid tolkningen och tillämpningen av förföljelsegrunderna, besvarar 
och/eller är känslig för de olika kategorierna av feministisk kritik av 
flyktingrätten som Thomas Spijkerboer har identifierat.   
 
Enligt UNHCR täcker flyktingdefinitionen i 1951 års flyktingkonvention 
redan in könsrelaterad förföljelse om den tolkas på ett riktigt sätt. Detta fastän 
”kön” eller ”genus” inte finns med som förföljelsegrunder. UNHCR har också 
uttryckt att alla förföljelse grunderna måste beaktas vid könsrelaterade 
asylskäl och att de alla måste tolkas på ett genusmedvetet sätt. Fastän alla 
förföljelsegrunderna kan vara tillämpliga i fall där någon riskerar 
könsrelaterad förföljelse är det ”medlemskap i en särskild samhällsgrupp” 
som oftast tillämpas i dessa fall. Detta beror till stor del på att kvinnor har 
ansetts kunna utgöra en särskild samhällsgrupp. UNHCR:s anföranden har 
tagits upp hos CEDAW kommittén. Kommittén har även uttryckt att det är i 
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enlighet med CEDAW att lägga till en förföljelsegrund, som kön, i den 
nationella lagstiftningen för att täcka in könsrelaterad förföljelse.   
 
År 2005 lades termen kön till i den svenska flyktingdefinitionen i syfte att 
anpassa utlänningslagen till den internationella tolkningen av ”medlemskap i 
en särskild samhällsgrupp”. I de svenska förarbetena togs UNHCR:s 
anföranden upp och lagstiftaren påpekade uttryckligen att könsrelaterad 
förföljelse kan inrymmas inom alla förföljelsegrunderna och inte enbart 
”medlemskap i en särskild samhällsgrupp”. Det fastställdes även att alla 
grunderna ska beaktas, utan inbördes rangordning, när förföljelse på grund av 
kön åberopas. Lagstiftarens intentioner har dock inte fått genomslag hos 
Migrationsöverdomstolen. Domstolen beaktar enbart kön under 
”medlemskap i en särskild samhällsgrupp” i fall med könsrelaterad förföljelse 
och den tar inte upp huruvida de andra förföljelse grunderna eventuell kan 
vara relevanta i fallet. Följaktligen överensstämmer den svenska 
rättstillämpningen inte med Utlänningslagen, 1951 års konvention och 
CEDAW.    
 
Denna uppsats visar även hur tolkningen och tillämpningen av 
förföljelsegrunderna kan kritiseras från ett feministiskt perspektiv. 
Tolkningen och tillämpningen av förföljelsegrunderna i 1951 års 
flyktingkonvention och Utlänningslagen samt förpliktelserna som 
identifierats av CEDAW kommittén besvarar till stor del ”the human rights 
approach” eftersom grunden ”medlemskap i en särskild samhällsgrupp” har 
framhävts och då det finns en tendens att betona den kulturella kontext som 
kvinnliga flyktingar kommer i från. Detta kan kritiseras enligt ”the anti-
essentialist critique” som menade att den emfas som ges till grunden 
”medlemskap i en särskild samhällsgrupp” leder till att man förstärker 
uppfattningen om att det bara är män som kan anses vara ”riktiga flyktingar” 
samt upprätthåller stereotypen om att de förföljelsegrunder som inte är 
”gendrifierade” är till för manliga asylansökande. ”Anti-essentialisterna” var 
emot att man betonade den kulturella kontexten eftersom det demoniserar 
tredje världen och reproducerar distinktionen mellan västvärlden och övriga 
länder. Det finns dock indikationer på att man går mot ett mer ”anti-
essentialistiskt” tänkande, särskilt hos CEDAW kommittén, eftersom 
emfasen som ges till grunden ”medlemskap i en särskild samhällsgrupp” vid 
könsrelaterade asylskäl har börjat ses som problematisk.     
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Abbreviations 
CAT Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhumane or 
Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment 
 
CEAS   Common European Asylum System 
 
CEDAW   Convention on the Elimination of  
All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women  
 
CEDAW Committee  United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women 
 
ECHR   European Court of Human Rights 
 
EU   European Union  
 
FGM   Female genital mutilation  
 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
 
ICERD International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination  
 
ICJ   International Court of Justice 
 
IDP   Internally Displaced Person 
 
MIG   Migrationsöverdomstolens  
   avgörande 
 
Para.    Paragraph  
 
Prop.    Proposition 
 
SOU   Statens offentliga utredningar 
 
UN    United Nations 
 
UNHCR   United Nations High  
Commissioner for refugees  
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UDHR Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 
 
UtlL   Utlänningslagen 
 
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties  
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was, like many other 
international human rights instruments, written from a male perspective. The 
relevance of gender was only brought up once during the drafting process of 
the Convention. The Yugoslav delegate suggested an inclusion of the wording 
“or sex” into the article that states that the Convention shall be applied 
“without discrimination as to race, religion or country of origin”. However, 
the suggestion was rejected since the equality of the sexes was considered a 
matter for national legislation. The then United Nations (UN) high 
commissioner for refugees expressed that he strongly doubted that there 
would be any cases of persecution due to sex.1 It is therefore not surprising 
that the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention historically has been 
interpreted “through a framework of male experiences”, which has resulted 
in that many asylum claims of female applicants have been ignored.2 
 
During the past decades, increasingly more attention has been brought to the 
issue of female refugees and asylum seekers. Today it is an established 
principle that the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention should be 
interpreted with an “awareness of possible gender dimensions in order to 
determine accurately claims to refugee status”.3  
 
An important aspect of refugee claims is the question of the reason for the 
persecution, in legal terms what persecution ground is applicable in the 
determination of refugee status. The refugee definition of the 1951 
Convention establishes five persecution grounds: race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion and membership of a particular social group. In order to 
qualify for refugee status, the applicant must show that the reason why he or 
she is at risk of persecution is related to at least one of these grounds.  
 
It has been argued that the neglect of the issue of gender in the 1951 
Convention can “be seen as an important factor leading to a failure to take 
into account gender-related persecution and the protection needs of women 
asylum seekers and refugees”.4 The term “gender-related persecution” has no 
legal meaning per se5 but is used in international refugee law when the reason 
for the persecution is fully or partially based on notions of gender.6 Since 
                                                 
1 Freedman 2012, p. 48; Spijkerboer 2000, p. 1. 
2 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International Protection 
No.1: Gender-related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2)  of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 
May 2002 (Hereafter: UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution), para. 5.  
3 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 2.     
4 Freedman 2012, p. 48.  
5 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 1. 
6 Crawley 2001, p. 7; Bexelius 2008, p. 17.  
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“sex” or “gender” are not included amongst the persecution grounds, the 
question if an applicant who risks gender-related persecution qualifies for 
refugee status will depend on whether the persecution in question can be 
considered to fall within the ambit of the established persecution ground. In 
the course of this, the persecution grounds must be interpreted in a gender-
sensitive manner.7 
 
The UN’s refugee agency, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(the UNHCR) and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (the CEDAW Committee) have stressed that a gender-
sensitive interpretation must be given to each of the persecution grounds and 
established how the persecution grounds can be interpreted to cover certain 
gender-related grounds of persecution.8 However, although all of the 
persecution grounds may encompass gender-related motivations, gender-
related grounds of persecution are mostly discussed under the persecution 
ground “membership of a particular social group”.9 
 
Sweden has ratified the 1951 Convention and CEDAW and is thereby bound 
under international law to respect their provisions. The issue of gender-related 
persecution was raised in connection with the adoption of the new Aliens 
Act10 in 2005. By this time, Sweden adopted a new refugee definition which 
establishes that aliens who risk “persecution on grounds of kön, sexual 
orientation or other membership of a particular social group” can be 
recognized as refugees. As a result, persecution on grounds of kön can now 
be considered under the persecution ground “membership of a particular 
social group”, which was not possible before the amendment. This new 
wording of the Swedish refugee definition has resulted in that the persecution 
ground “membership of a particular social group” has been greatly 
emphasized in cases involving gender-related persecution in Swedish case 
law.   
 
The development of the gender-sensitive interpretation of the persecution 
grounds has been both fuelled by and developed in tandem with feminist 
critique of refugee law. How the issue of gender has been, and ought to be, 
dealt with in refugee law has been discussed amongst feminist scholars. The 
interpretation and application of the persecution grounds has been central in 
this debate, in particular the question regarding how the persecution grounds 
can be considered to encompass gender-related persecution. Moreover, 
                                                 
7 Zimmermann & Mahler 2011, p. 415.    
8 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related persecution, para. 22; UN Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), General recommendation No. 32 
on the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of 
women, CEDAW/C/GC/32, 5 November 2014, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/54620fb54.html [accessed 7 January 2016], (Hereafter: 
General recommendation No. 32), para. 13.  
9 Zimmermann & Mahler 2011, p. 416.    
10 Utlänningslagen (UtlL) (2005:716). 
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feminist scholars have identified different concerns that they consider should 
be recognized in refugee law.11 
 
1.2 Purpose 
This thesis aims to investigate what is at stake for women asylum seekers 
depending on how the persecution grounds of the refugee definition are 
designed, justified and applied. More specifically, I want to investigate the 
consequences of how the persecution grounds of the refugee definition are 
interpreted and applied to encompass gender-related persecution. I do this by 
investigating how gender-related persecution has been included in 
international and national law in the interpretation and application of the 
persecution grounds; how these instruments, in their approach to encompass 
gender-related persecution, correspond to each other; and which feminist 
critiques these legal instruments answer to or remain sensitive to. The 
applicable persecution ground in cases involving gender-related persecution 
is decided by an interplay between international and national law and practice. 
I therefore set out to investigate both these levels and their interplay. My 
purpose is to map this and to evaluate from a feminist perspective what is at 
stake depending on which persecution ground is applied.   
 
The interpretation and application of the persecution grounds are an important 
dimension in women’s asylum claims. This is particularly evident in the 
feminist critique of international refugee law. Since considerations of gender 
aspects have been excluded from refugee law, many female applicants have 
not been granted refugee status since the reasons for the persecution that they 
have risked being subjected to have not been considered to fall within the 
scope of the established persecution grounds of the refugee definition.  
Furthermore, the emphasis that has been given to the ground “membership of 
a particular social group” in gender-related claims has been criticised for 
resulting in that women’s asylum claims are regularly referred to this ground 
and not being properly assessed. Lastly, the way refugee law is designed and 
justified has been criticised for creating a division between refugee receiving 
Western States against refugee producing non-Western States by depicting 
the non-Western States as inferior.  
 
1.3 Research question  
My research questions in this thesis divides roughly into three categories. The 
first category of research questions concerns the legal examination of 
international and national law. More precisely, these questions concerns how 
the persecution grounds are interpreted and applied to encompass gender-
related persecution under different legal instruments. The research questions 
of this category read as follows:  
                                                 
11 See more about this in chapter 1.6.  
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 What are the main elements of determining who qualifies as a 
refugee? 
 
 How do the persecution grounds of the 1951 Convention encompass 
gender-related persecution? 
 
 What measures does the CEDAW Committee oblige its contracting 
States to take in order to fulfil its obligations under CEDAW when 
interpreting and applying the persecution grounds of the 1951 
Convention?    
 
 How do the persecution grounds of the Swedish Aliens Act 
encompass gender-related persecution?  
 
 What is the legal meaning and coverage of the term “persecution on 
grounds of kön” in the Swedish Aliens Act?  
 
 How has “persecution on grounds of kön” been interpreted and 
applied by the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal?  
 
The second category of research questions has to do with the correspondence 
and interplay between these legal instruments and their interpretation and 
application.  
 
 Is the approach to encompass gender-related persecution of the 1951 
Convention and the obligations identified by the CEDAW Committee 
in accordance? 
 
 Is the approach of the Swedish Aliens Act to encompass gender-
related persecution in accordance with the approach of the 1951 
Convention and the obligations identified by the CEDAW 
Committee?  
 
 Is the approach to encompass gender-related persecution in the case 
law of the Migration Court of Appeal in accordance with the approach 
of the Swedish Aliens Act, the approach of the 1951 Convention and 
the obligations identified by the CEDAW Committee? 
 
The third category relates to how the law, in its interpretation and application 
of the persecution grounds, answers to and/or remains sensitive to different 
categories of feminist critique of refugee law identified by Thomas 
Spijkerboer.  
 
 How does the interpretation of the persecution grounds of the 1951 
Convention answer to and/or remain sensitive to the feminist critique 
identified by Spijkerboer? 
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 How do the obligations identified by the CEDAW Committee answer 
to and/or remain sensitive to the feminist critiques identified by 
Spijkerboer?  
 
 How does the interpretation of the persecution grounds of the Swedish 
Aliens Act answer to and/or remain sensitive to the feminist critiques 
identified by Spijkerboer?  
 
 How does the case law of the Migration Court of Appeal answer to 
and/or remain sensitive to, the feminist critiques identified by 
Spijkerboer?   
 
1.4 Methodology 
In order to answer my research questions, I will use legal methods and a 
gender theory-driven analysis. In chapters two and three, I will apply the 
international legal method when examining the relevant provisions in the 
1951 Convention and CEDAW. In chapters four and five, the traditional legal 
method will be used when studying the Swedish refugee definition and its 
persecution grounds. Lastly, gender theory will be employed at the end of 
each chapter and in chapter six. A more thorough presentation of these 
methods is given below.    
 
1.4.1 International legal method 
Interpretation of treaties under international law is primarily subjected to the 
principles of treaty interpretation codified in article 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). These principles provide the 
starting point for the interpretation of treaties and are said to reflect the 
position of customary international law.12 Article 31 contains the general rule 
of interpretation which establishes the following:  
 
Article 31. General Rule of Interpretation  
  
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.  
 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in 
addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties 
in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related 
to the treaty.  
 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
                                                 
12 McAdam 2011, p. 82; Mechlem 2009, p. 910 – 911.   
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(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of 
the treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.  
 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. 
 
The logical starting point for the interpretation is the general linguistic usage 
(the ordinary meaning of a term), which may only be deviated from if a 
special meaning was intended by the States parties.13 Although there has been 
some debate concerning whether a literal interpretation based on the ordinary 
meaning of a term has interpretive precedence, the view that paragraph 1 to 3 
should be seen as steps to be taken in logical progression, rather than a 
hierarchy for interpretation, has been claimed to be a better reflection of 
contemporary judicial practice.14 This view has also been affirmed by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which has argued that “the term ‘ordinary 
meaning’ cannot be read in isolation”.15 Hence, the text, the context and the 
overall object and purpose of the treaty should all be viewed together when 
interpreting the instrument and none of these three elements may be given 
more weight than the others.16   
  
The context of a treaty, as described in article 31.2 VCLT, includes not only 
the text, preamble and annexes of the treaty, but also material related to the 
conclusion of the treaty. It is also shown that the context is not a static or 
purely historical concept, as article 31.3 includes subsequent agreement 
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application 
of its provisions, subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, and any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.17  
 
The third element, the object and purpose of the treaty, involves seeking the 
interpretation that is most appropriate in order to realise the aims and achieve 
the objectives of the treaty.18 The object and purpose of a treaty may be 
revealed by the text itself, but the treaties preamble is usually the starting 
point for analysis of the object and purpose.19 When it comes to human rights 
instruments, the main object is for States parties to protect the rights set out 
in the treaties.20 However, the treaty may also contain other values, such as 
the security and integrity of a State, which may be included through 
derogations and limitation clauses. It should be noted that in contrast to other 
international treaties, which normally aim to achieve a reciprocal exchange 
                                                 
13 Nowak 2003, p. 65; Article 31.4 VCLT.  
14 McAdam 2011, p. 83.  
15 McAdam 2011, p. 83.  
16 McAdam 2011, p. 83; Mechlem 2009, p. 911.  
17 Hathaway & Foster 2014, p. 9.  
18 Mechlem 2009, p. 912.  
19 McAdam 2011, p. 91; Hathaway & Foster 2014, p. 10.  
20 Nowak 2003, p. 65. 
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of rights for the mutual benefit of the parties, human right treaties are geared 
toward third-party beneficiaries. Due to this particular characteristic, the 
interpretation of human rights treaties should be performed in a way that is 
adequately favourable to the effective protection of individual rights.21      
 
Article 32 VCLT describes when supplementary means of interpretation can 
be applied:  
 
Article 32. Supplementary Means of Interpretation  
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to 
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine 
the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:  
(a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 
Although article 32 describes the preparatory work as supplementary, they 
are given much relevance in practice. 
 
1.4.2 Traditional legal method 
The traditional legal method, sometimes referred to as the legal dogmatic 
method, will be applied in chapter four and five where I examine the content 
of the Swedish persecution grounds in the Swedish Aliens Act. The legal 
dogmatic method aims to provide an authoritative statement of the applicable 
law.22 I have, in accordance with this method, interpreted the generally 
accepted legal sources in order to determine the prevalent legal position. The 
legal sources in question are ranked in the following order, starting with the 
most important of them: law, preparatory work, case law and doctrine.23  
 
1.4.3 Theory-driven analytical method  
In addition to establishing the content of the law by using the legal methods 
which I have presented above, I will apply feminist theory24 in order to 
identify what is at stake depending on what legal solutions are chosen. This 
means that I will analyse the law from different feminist perspectives in order 
to evaluate the rationale for and consequences of the legal solutions chosen. 
 
                                                 
21 Mechlem 2009, p. 912.  
22 Olsen 2004, p. 111.   
23 Sandgren 2006, p. 37; Korling & Zamboni 2013, p. 21. It should be noted that this ranking 
of the legal sources is not established in law and the importance given to the various sources 
of law has varied over time, see Stern 2008, p. 18. 
24 Feminist theory is presented in section 1.6 below. 
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1.5 Material 
In accordance with the international legal method, I have primarily studied 
the 1951 Convention with its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 
and CEDAW.  
 
The 1951 Convention does not establish an international court, tribunal or 
committee that can resolve differences in the interpretation and application of 
the Convention’s provisions.25 Although there is a possibility provided under 
article 38 of the Convention and article IV of the 1967 Protocol to refer 
disputes about the interpretation or application of the Convention to the ICJ, 
it has never been applied.26 It is therefore the domestic decision-makers that 
are ultimately tasked to determine the meaning of the Convention. Since the 
definition is applied by a widely divergent group of States, the domestic 
interpretations of the refugee definition may vary significantly.27 The 
domestic decisions that I refer to28 should therefore be interpreted cautiously 
and they cannot be expected to reflect how the rest of the States parties to the 
Convention interpret the refugee definition.     
 
In my examination of the refugee definition, I have to a large extent studied 
documents issued by the UNHCR. The UNHCR is, amongst other things, 
commissioned to provide interpretive guidance regarding who qualifies for 
refugee status and what rights these persons have. I have mainly used the 
Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees29 and Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-
Related Persecution within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. The 
Handbook and Guidelines are intended to provide legal interpretive guidance 
to government officials, judges, practitioners an UNHCR staff. 
 
It should be mentioned that there are some controversies regarding whether 
the agency’s published positions should be treated as subsequent agreements 
between the parties within the meaning of article 31.3(a) VCLT. Most of these 
documents, issued by the UNHCR, have been agreed upon by only a select 
number of States and, in some cases, by non-party States. The creation of 
these documents may therefore be considered to deviate from what normally 
would be expected of a “subsequent agreement” between parties. Hence, the 
views of the UNHCR on how the provision of the 1951 Convention should 
be interpreted are not binding on States parties as a matter of treaty 
                                                 
25 Hathaway & Foster 2014, p. 3.  
26 McAdam 2011, p. 79. 
27 Hathaway & Foster 2014, p. 3.  
28 I refer to the case from New Zealand, which I present in chapter 2.3 and the cases from the 
Migration Court of Appeal which are presented in chapter 5,   
29 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Handbook and Guidelines on 
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3, December 2011, 
(Hereafter: UNHCR Handbook or Handbook).     
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interpretation.30 However, given the duty of States parties under article 35 of 
the Convention to cooperate with the UNHCR in the exercise of its functions 
and to facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the 
Convention, serious engagement with UNHCR advice can be expected and 
its policy documents should against this background be taken into account. 
Moreover, Swedish authorities are recommended to use, not only the 
preparatory works and case law of the Aliens Act, but also the Handbook and 
Guidelines when interpreting the Swedish refugee definition.31 The 
Handbook has even been recognized as an “important source of law” by the 
Swedish Migration Court of Appeal.32 Superior courts of the States parties to 
the 1951 Convention have made many statements regarding the importance 
of the Handbook when interpreting the Convention. It has even been claimed 
to constitute international practice within the meaning of article 31.3(b).33 I 
have against this background concluded that UNHCR’s Handbook and its 
Guidelines are important and authoritative interpretation tools which are 
much relied upon by the domestic authorities of the contracting States.   
 
In my study of CEDAW I have, in addition to the convention, consulted 
general recommendations, in particular General recommendation No. 32 on 
the gender-related dimensions of refugee status, asylum, nationality and 
statelessness of women, which is central to this study. Although the general 
recommendations are not legally binding as such, they are of great importance 
in order to understand the practical use of CEDAW. There is a wide 
agreement that comments and observations made by treaty bodies are 
important interpretation tools, however, opinions differ regarding whether 
findings of the treaty bodies constitute subsequent practice in accordance with 
article 31.3(b) VCLT.34 Irrespective of this, I conclude that the CEDAW 
Committee in their general recommendations provide authoritative guidance 
to the States parties on appropriate measures to ensure the implementation of 
their obligations under CEDAW. 
 
Furthermore, I have used legal doctrine in my application of the international 
legal method. In chapter two, I have primarily used The 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol – A Commentary, 
edited by Andreas Zimmermann and The Law of Refugee Status by James 
Hathaway and Michelle Foster. These authors are among the most prominent 
experts on refugee law and their work has received international recognition.  
 
Further examples of legal doctrine that have been used in this study are: Bevis 
8. Prövning av migrationsärenden, written by Christian Diesen, Annika 
Lagerqvist Veloz Roca, Karolina Lindholm Billing, Madelaine Seidlitz and 
Alexandra Wilton Wahren and Migrationsrätt written by Rebecca Stern in 
chapter 13 of Mänskliga rättigheter – juridiska perspective edited by Anna  
                                                 
30 Hathaway & Foster 2014, p. 10.  
31 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 8.  
32 MIG 2006:1; MIG 2006:7, authors translation.   
33 See examples of such statements in McAdam 2011, p. 111 & 97.   
34 See for example Mechlem 2009, p. 919 – 922 and Villiger 2009, p. 431.  
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Lundberg. All of these authors are prominent actors within the field of 
migration law, both as academics and as practitioners.  
 
In my application of the traditional legal method, I have studied the Swedish 
Aliens Act35 and its preparatory works. I have primarily used the government 
bill prop. 2005/06:6 Flyktingskap och förföljelse på grund av kön eller sexuell 
läggning and the inquiry SOU 2004:31 Flyktingskap och könsrelaterad 
förföljelse. These documents have provided guidance in my understanding of 
the Swedish refugee definition and the legislator’s aims and purposes of 
adding the term kön to the refugee definition.          
 
In chapter five, I have chosen to study and analyse case law solely from the 
Migration Court of Appeal, which is the highest instance. It should be noted 
that leave to appeal is required in order to have a decision of one of the 
migration courts tried at the Migration Court of Appeal.36 Leave to appeal 
may be issued on two grounds: if it is of importance for the guidance of the 
application of the law or if there are other exceptional grounds for examining 
the appeal.37 An exceptional ground could be that the Migration Court has 
committed a so called procedural error.38 A consequence of these 
requirements for leave to appeal is that the Migration Court of Appeal cannot 
accept a case to trial solely because one of the parties claims that the 
Migration Court has made an erroneous judgement. Hence, it is not possible 
for all cases that have been tried at the Migration Court to be examined by the 
Migration Court of Appeal.39 
 
Lastly, the dissertation Gender and Refugee Status by Thomas Spijkerboer40 
has been central in my application of the theory-driven analytical method. 
The academic articles and doctrine that Spijkerboer refers to in his study have 
also been explored in this regard. Furthermore, in order to develop the ideas 
of the authors that Spijkerboer refers to, I have looked into the works that they 
in turn have referred to. In order to define the common elements in all feminist 
theory, I have used Split Decisions by Janet Halley and Feminist Legal Theory 
by Nancy Levit and Robert Verchick.      
 
1.6 Theory  
As mentioned earlier, my aim is to analyse the legal material that I have 
studied for the purpose of this essay from a feminist perspective. I have 
therefore chosen to employ feminist theory. It should be mentioned that, 
although “feminists agree on the goal of equality, they disagree about its 
                                                 
35 Utlänningslagen (2005:716) 
36 See chapter 16 section 11 UtlL.  
37 These grounds are called prejudikatdispens and extraordinär dispens, see chapter 16 
section 12 UtlL.  
38 See for example Mål nr UM 4110-07, 2007-12-14.   
39 Stern 2008, p. 20.  
40 Professor of Law, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.  
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meaning and on how to achieve it”.41 As a result, there is a huge variety of 
different schools and categories within feminist theory. It is not surprising 
that feminism has been described as “a house with many rooms”.42   
 
This study is based on Levit and Verchick’s description of the shared features 
of all feminist theories. In their view, all feminist theories share two things: 
an observation and an aspiration. The observation is that men, particularly 
white men, have shaped the world and “for this reason possess larger shares 
of power and privilege”. The aspiration is that “women and men should have 
political, social and economic equality”.43       
 
In addition, I take Halley’s definition of feminism as my point of departure in 
this study. She points out three characteristics that in her view are noticeable 
in every form of feminism. First, a position must distinguish between m 
(men/male/masculine) and f (women, female, feminine), in order to be 
feminism.44 Second, feminism “must posit some kind of subordination as 
between m and f, in which f is the disadvantaged or subordinated element”.45 
Third, “feminism opposes the subordination of f”.46        
 
When it comes to international human rights law, feminist scholars argue that 
it constitutes a set of “male” rights that are “defined by the criterion of what 
men fear will happen to them”, resulting in that the content of the rules of 
international law privilege men and ignore women’s interests. Feminist 
theory further criticizes international human rights for “adopting the “male” 
sex as the standard against which all individuals are judged”, which results in 
that women become a deviation from this standard.47  
 
1.6.1 Spijkerboer’s three categories of feminist 
critique  
As a natural consequence of the different categories of feminism, the feminist 
critique of refugee law varies as well. Although there is a shared view that 
gender matters in the refugee law discourse, the opinions differ greatly 
regarding for instance how and to what extent gender matters, as well as 
which strategies should be adopted in order to “solve the gender problem in 
refugee law”.48 
 
Migration law professor Spijkerboer has made important contributions to the 
research regarding the role of gender in refugee law and his studies have been 
recognized internationally. In his dissertation, Gender and Refugee Status, he 
                                                 
41 Levit & Verchick 2006, p. 16. 
42 Levit & Verchick 2006, p. 8.  
43 Levit & Verchick 2006, p. 15 – 16.   
44 Halley 2006, p. 17.  
45 Halley 2006, p. 18.  
46 Halley 2006, p. 18.   
47 Edwards 2008, p. 9.   
48 Nykänen 2012, p. 120.  
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identifies three generations of feminist critique of refugee law that have 
developed during the past decades, namely “the early critics”, “the human 
rights approach” and “the anti-essentialist critique”. These categories of 
feminist critique of refugee law will be examined below. The focus will be 
on what concerns these categories of feminist critique have emphasised, 
which solutions they have recommended, and the critique that they in turn 
have attracted. As mentioned above, one of the purposes of the thesis is to 
determine how the interpretation and application of the persecution grounds 
and the obligations identified by the CEDAW Committee hold up to these 
feminist critiques.  
 
I am aware of that this categorization by Spijkerboer gives a somewhat 
simplified picture of the complex criticism and analysis made by these 
authors. However, although these categories of feminist critique are not 
entirely coherent, they all have a distinct emphasis that differentiates them 
from one another. I will in the following sections explain what characterizes 
each group.    
 
This study will mainly focus on the human rights approach and the anti-
essentialist critique, since it is my point of departure to examine in which 
ways the law can be useful in dealing with this issue; assuming thusly, in 
contrast to the early critiques, that law can be of use here. 
 
1.6.1.1 The early critics  
The main purpose of the early critics was to get the issue of women and 
refugee status on the agenda.49 Marijke Meijer and Doreen Indra were, 
according to Spijkerboer, at the forefront of this category of critique.50 In 
Spijkerboer’s view, these authors saw themselves as engaging in a universal 
struggle against patriarchy, and what they wished to highlight was how the 
experiences of female applicants were different from those of men and that 
this was not sufficiently acknowledged in refugee law.51  
 
Spijkerboer writes that the early critics identified two main factors that caused 
the specificity of female refugee experiences. First, women and men have 
different relationships to the State and the public sphere in the country of 
origin. Women, as opposed to men, are forced to live primarily in the private 
sphere. Second, “women are oppressed simply because they are women”.52 A 
risk of persecution could thus arise as a consequence of an infringement of 
the moral or ethical values of the society, for example by not complying with 
dress codes or refusing a contracted marriage. It could also arise if a woman 
is considered to have failed in her function as a wife or mother, or is engaged 
politically.53 According to Spijkerboer, the early critics considered that 
refugee law did not address these specific experiences of female applicants 
                                                 
49 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 163.  
50 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 163.  
51 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 163.  
52 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 164.  
53 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 164.  
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and they especially emphasized how women’s private sphere activities were 
not seen as political.54  
 
It should be noted in this regard that this type of critique of the distinction 
drawn between the public and private spheres is not unique to refugee law. 
The so-called public/private dichotomy in international human rights law, 
which was conventionally premised on the liberal, minimalistic conception 
of the State, has been said to be one of the main obstacles to the protection of 
women’s rights.55 Since international law privileges the public sphere over 
the private sphere, thereby refusing to recognize the specificity of women’s 
life in the private sphere, it ignores and marginalizes women’s concerns and 
interests.56 The private sphere has been seen as off limits to State intervention, 
resulting in that abuses against women many times have not been regarded as 
violations of their human rights. As expressed by the UN Commission on 
Human Rights: “In many parts of the world, the struggle for human rights 
seems to end at one’s doorstep”.57 
 
Now, we return to the early critics and look closer into Indra. She wrote that 
generalized references to refugees “obscure the ways in which gender may 
play a major role in how refugees are created, and how distinct the refugee 
situation can be for women and men”.58 Her conclusion was that women 
refugees have a lower probability of gaining refugee status, since “the key 
criteria for being a refugee are drawn primarily from the realm of public 
sphere activities dominated by men”.59 Indra argued that gender ought to be 
added as a persecution ground in the refugee definition. She mentioned the 
omission of gender from the 1951 Convention grounds as an illustration of 
“the depth of gender delegitimation in refugee contexts”.60  She considered it 
to be remarkable that sex and gender oppressions were not even mentioned in 
the refugee definition, while “oppression arising from parallel forms of 
invidious status distinction such as race or religious convictions are central”.61  
 
Meijer likewise considered that sex was one of the grounds that were 
specifically lacking in the refugee definition. She further argued that it was 
not impossible to include persecution because of social position, based on a 
person’s sexual status, as an instance of persecution because of belonging to 
                                                 
54 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 164.  
55 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, Its Causes and Consequences on the Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the 
Elimination of Violence against Women, E/CN.4/2006/61, 20 January 2006, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/45377afb0.html [accessed 7 January 2016], (Hereafter: UN 
Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, Its Causes and Consequences on the Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the 
Elimination of Violence against Women), para. 59.  
56 Edwards 2008, p. 10.  
57 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women, Its Causes and Consequences on the Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the 
Elimination of Violence against Women, para. 60.   
58 Indra 1987, p. 3.  
59 Indra 1987, p. 3.  
60 Indra 1987, p. 3.  
61 Indra 1987, p. 3.   
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a specific social group. 62 The UNHCR and the Council of Europe had not yet 
recognized this position at this point in time, but the European Parliament had 
expressed in a resolution that women could be deemed to belong to a “specific 
social group” within the meaning of the refugee definition.63 Moreover, on a 
national level, the Dutch Refugee Association had taken the position that 
persecution because of belonging to a specific social group also included 
persecution because of the social position based on sexual status.64 Meijer 
hoped that the position of the Dutch Refugee Association would “contribute 
to the awareness and acknowledgement of women’s oppression and women’s 
resistance”.65 
 
Spijkerboer writes that the early critics engaged in an attack on the pretended 
neutrality of the law. Their claim was not that law would solve the problem 
when properly applied. Instead, even though they made specific suggestions 
for how the law should be used, they saw the law itself as the problem. Lastly, 
he claims that they considered that a fight was needed in order to make the 
oppression of women in the private sphere into a political issue.66  
 
Hence, what characterizes the early critics is, according to Spijkerboer, their 
will to unite all women in a fight against patriarchy and violence against 
women. They engaged in a politicized attack on refugee law, which they saw 
as an institution reflecting male domination.67 They promoted a greater 
recognition of the specificity of female applicants’ experiences and that these 
should be acknowledged in refugee law. They argued that political activities 
in the private sphere should be recognized as political. What concerns the 
approach to encompass gender-related persecution, which is the focus of this 
thesis, they recommend that gender ought to be added to the enumerated 
persecution grounds “in order to cover the oppression of women”68, although 
the social group ground “already provided the basis for recognizing the 
victims of women’s oppressions as refugees”.69 Lastly, all the while engaging 
in efforts to reform the law, they remained sceptical about whether the law 
itself could bring a solution.70  
 
1.6.1.2 The human rights approach 
The early critics have in turn been criticized by, what Spijkerboer calls, “the 
human rights approach”.71 Spijkerboer identifies Jacqueline Greatbatch as the 
pioneer of this approach. She argued that the early critics, such as Indra and 
Meijer, assume a “bifurcated version of social reality”, where men dominate 
                                                 
62 Meijer 1985, p. 33 – 34.  
63 Meijer 1985, p. 33.  
64 Meijer 1985, p. 34.  
65 Meijer 1985, p. 37.  
66 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 165.  
67 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 171.  
68 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 164.  
69 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 164.  
70 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 164 – 165.  
71 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 163.  
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the public sphere while women are referred to the private sphere, which is 
presumed to be the site of gender oppression.  
 
This analysis founders on its ahistoric, acultural approach to women’s oppression, 
in addition to its inattention to key aspects of the Convention definition and its 
overarching limitations. The bifurcated version of society itself ignores the realms 
of women’s lives outside domesticity, and creates a rhetorical and theoretical wall 
between domestic and social culture. It roots women’s oppression in sexuality and 
private life, thereby disregarding oppression experienced in non-domestic 
circumstances, and the interconnections of the public and private spheres.72    
 
According to Spijkerboer, Greatbatch added two important issues to the 
debate. First, she opposed how the early critics homogenized women’s 
experiences by erasing the specific context the asylum seeking women come 
from. Second, she criticized their implicit assumption of the inflexibility of 
the law. 73 Spijkerboer sees Greatbatch’s article as the starting point for the 
generation of feminist critique of refugee law which he calls the human rights 
approach, which he means is characterized by a tendency to analyse the 
experiences of refugee women through a cultural lens. Instead of applying the 
internationalist perspective of the early critics, the human rights approach 
located women’s problems in culture.74 Much attention was directed to non-
Western societies and these authors frequently expressed great concern “for 
those women who are caught in the barbaric hold of their cultures and 
religions”.75 
 
One of the authors who Spijkerboer identifies as a supporter of the human 
rights approach is Linda Cipriani. Like the early critics, she argued that 
gender should be added as one more ground for refugee protection since “it 
would protect women from institutionalized misogyny in which the 
government carries out, sanctions or ignores oppression of or violence against 
women because they are women”.76 She expressed that Islam is the most 
notorious example of such persecution “with its strict rules regarding the 
status and behavior of women”.77 She also pointed out Hinduism in India, 
tribal practices in Africa and the tradition of machismo in Latin America as 
examples of contexts where women suffer human rights violations.78 
 
Another author who Spijkerboer refers to is David Neal. Neal wrote that the 
Third World is hardly alone in failing to provide sufficient protection to 
women, however, “the social relations of many third world nations are still 
dominated by religious, tribal, or societal customs which accommodate, if not 
sanction, the persecution of women”. 79 He further expressed that “abuses 
within Islam, though obviously not unique, are perhaps the most conspicuous 
                                                 
72 Greatbatch 1989, p. 520; Quoted in Spijkerboer 2000, p. 165.  
73 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 165-166.  
74 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 166.  
75 Razack 1995, p. 55.  
76 Cipriani 1993, p. 513.  
77 Cipriani 1993, p. 513.  
78 Cipriani 1993, p. 513.  
79 Neil 1990, p. 207.  
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in contemporary times”.80 Neil brought up the treatment of women in post-
Revolution Iran as an example of “the type of milieu in which sex-persecution 
can be found”.81   
 
Daniel McLaughlin is mentioned as a representative of the human rights 
approach as well. In his article Recognizing Gender-Based Persecution as 
Grounds for Asylum, he wrote that institutionalized gender discrimination is 
a pervasive reality in the Third World and among the developing countries, 
which permeates every segment of society and culture.82    
 
From the perspective of the human rights approach, says Spijkerboer, 
“refugee women suffer from tradition or, conversely, a lack of progress and 
modernity with emancipation and human rights as an important part”.83  
 
Spijkerboer notes that the authors within the human rights approach had 
different opinions concerning which persecution ground is the most 
appropriate to encompass gender-based persecution. Some recommended that 
gender should be added as a persecution ground,84 others argued that victims 
of intimate violence and female genital mutilation (FGM) can be perceived 
as expressing a dissenting political opinion when they flee their home 
country.85 The leading position within the approach was, however, that 
gender-based persecution could be address by considering categories of 
women as a social group within the meaning of the refugee definition.86  
 
In contrast to the early critics, the human rights approach argued that the 
problem could be solved by the law.87 This display of faith in the legal system 
was, according to Spijkerboer, consistent with the tactics deployed by several 
authors of the human rights approach, who were in favour of adopting 
concrete rules. One of these authors was Nancy Kelly, who wrote Guidelines 
for Women’s Asylum Claims. Kelly emphasized the role of culture in 
women’s oppression, distinguished gender-neutral persecution of women 
from gender-related asylum claims88 and favoured the use of the persecution 
ground “membership of a particular social group” to target gender-related 
persecution.89 
 
In sum, the human rights approach emphasized the cultural context refugee 
women come from and used culture as an explanation of why women are 
subjected to human rights violations in certain countries. The authors of the 
human rights approach especially highlighted traditional, cultural and 
religious practices affecting women in developing countries and Third World 
                                                 
80 Neil 1990, p. 208.  
81 Neil 1990, p. 204 & 210 – 222. 
82 McLaughlin 1994, p. 222.  
83 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 166.  
84 For example Cipriani 1993, p. 538 & 545; McLaughlin 1994, p. 244 & 239.   
85 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 167.  
86 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 167 – 168; Greatbatch 1989, p. 526; Neil 1990, p. 228, 230 & 257.  
87 Spijkerboer 2000 p. 168.  
88 Kelly 1994, p. 143.  
89 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
 24 
countries. As regards which persecution ground is more appropriate to 
encompass gender-based persecution, different positions was taken by 
different authors of the human rights approach. However, according to 
Spijkerboer, the persecution ground “membership of a particular social 
group” received the most recognition.90 Lastly, they argued that the problems 
of refugee women could be solved in law and promoted the adoption of very 
concrete rules and guidelines to address the issue.  
 
1.6.1.3 The anti-essentialist critique 
Spijkerboer identifies himself with the so-called anti-essentialist critique. He 
describes it as a three-pronged critique, which is an elaboration of the critique 
of gender as well as ethnic essentialism in both general social and legal 
theory.91 Spijkerboer mentions the postcolonial feminist theorist Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty as one of the authors who inspired the anti-essentialists.   
 
Postcolonial thinking is not a coherent theory, but it is frequently used to 
describe studies that analyse the remaining effects of colonialism and the 
resistance to this in different parts of the world.92 For instance, it highlights 
how Western culture gained its strength and identity by setting itself off 
against other cultures that were described as inferior.93 Postcolonial theorists 
have claimed that the West has created a negative image of the non-Western 
world in order to show the superiority of the West and thereby legitimize 
Western imperialism.94 Postcolonial feminist theory developed as a reaction 
against feminism that was perceived as only focusing on the experiences of 
women in Western cultures and thereby misrepresenting women living in 
non-Western countries.  
 
In her article Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourses, Mohanty opposed how Western feminism95 wrote about Third 
World women as a singular monolithic subject.96 She criticized what she 
called “Eurocentric” feminism for homogenizing and systematizing the 
experiences of different groups of women in other cultures, which she 
believed erased all marginal and resistant modes of experiences. She showed 
how Third World women were constructed as a homogeneous powerless 
group and often located as implicit victims of particular socio-economic 
systems.97 
 
With this in mind, the anti-essentialists argued that the human rights approach 
relied on “stereotypes which locate gender oppression in the indigenous 
                                                 
90 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 167 – 168. 
91 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 163 & 169.  
92 Mohanty 1984, p. 9.   
93 Said 1978, p. 3.  
94 Gemzöe 2002, p. 151. 
95 By using the term ”Western feminism”, Mohanty wants to draw attention to ”the similar 
effects of various textual strategies used by particular writers that codify Others as non-
Western and hence themselves as (implicitly) Western”, see Mohanty 1984, p. 334.       
96 Mohanty 1984, p. 333.  
97 Mohanty 1984, p. 338.  
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cultures of the Third World and represent the Western countries of refuge as 
emancipated”.98 The human rights approach was further described as “an 
extension of legal practice in which women’s claims are most likely to 
succeed when they present themselves as victims of dysfunctional, 
exceptionally patriarchal cultures and states”.99 Hence, in order to be 
recognized as a refugee, the applicant must be recognized as “a cultural 
other”.100 Spijkerboer explains that the anti-essentialist critics stressed the 
importance of analysing women’s experiences contextually, but they were 
against the tendency of the human rights approach to emphasize the cultural 
context of the applicants as well as “the tendency to describe it in terms of the 
West’s monolithic Other”.101  
 
Concerning the focus of the thesis, the interpretation and application of the 
persecution grounds of the refugee definition in gender-related claims, 
Spijkerboer explains that the anti-essentialist critics were sceptical about the 
Convention ground “membership of a particular social group”. They saw a 
tendency of the human rights approach to frame any and all persecution of 
women as persecution because of gender, which the anti-essentialists feared 
would reinforce the view that only men can be considered as “real” refugees. 
“[I]t can reinforce women’s marginalization by implying that only men have 
political opinions, only men are activated by religion, only men have racial 
presence etc.”102 They meant that it may create and sustain the stereotype that 
the persecution grounds which are not explicitly “gendrified” are meant for 
male applicants.103 The persecution ground political opinion was instead 
considered to be the most effective and appropriate ground to frame women’s 
claims, for example when women refuse to conform to social mores.104 
According to Audrey Macklin, who Spijkerboer identifies as an anti-
essentialist, political opinion “may well include women’s opposition to 
extreme, institutionalized discrimination”.105 She wrote that political opinion 
does not suffer from the same partiality as religion or race, since it does not 
address only a single aspect of the persecution that female refugees 
experience. Instead, political opinion “equates resistance to gender 
oppression with a political opinion, thus seizing the language of liberal 
democratic rights discourse and refashioning it for feminist use”.106 Macklin 
saw it as profoundly feminist to identify women’s resistance to gender 
subordination as political opinion, if one believes that “the personal is 
political, and that patriarchy is a system constituted primarily through power 
relations, not biology”.107  
 
                                                 
98 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
99 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
100 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169; Razack 1995, p. 50.  
101 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
102 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
103 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169; Macklin 1995, p. 260.  
104 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169 – 170.   
105 Macklin 1995, p. 260.   
106 Macklin 1995, p. 260.  
107 Macklin 1995, p. 260.  
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The anti-essentialist critics argued that legal discourse was flexible enough to 
accommodate the asylum claims of women. However, like the early critics, 
they questioned whether legal reasoning in and of itself can bring about the 
solution, as suggested by the human rights approach. As Spijkerboer puts it: 
”Law is seen as a vehicle for arguments both for and against women, and legal 
reasoning is therefore seen as inconclusive. The real issue concerns the ideas 
about gender and ethnicity communicated through legal reasoning”.108 
Spijkerboer refers to Sherene Razack, who argued that an analysis of women 
in refugee determination procedures “suggests that we work with the manner 
in which immigration decisions are made rather than the matter of law, that 
is, its specific content”.  In her discussion of the Canadian Guidelines on 
gender persecution, she wrote that “the matter of the law has changed, at least 
at the level of guidelines, but this chance does not appear to have greatly 
interrupted the traditional lens through which refugees are viewed”. In order 
to change, she suggested “an unmasking of the trope of pity and compassion 
and a move towards a more political understanding of why women flee and 
what our responsibilities are to them”.109   
 
Spijkerboer considers that concrete rules and guidelines carry certain 
advantages, however, they also carry some disadvantages since they have 
been issued, not only out of concern for refugee women, but also for other 
goals that may conflict with those of the feminist critics. Spijkerboer explains 
that “the human rights approach was not successful in that their 
argumentations and the guidelines based on them reproduce the main 
distinctions underlying current practice: the distinction between “normal” 
versus “women’s” cases and the opposition of the West to the Rest”.110 
 
To summarise, the anti-essentialist critique was influenced by postcolonial 
feminist thinking and was against the emphasising of the cultural context by 
the human rights approach, which they meant demonised the Third World and 
reproduced the already occurring distinction between the Western and the 
non-Western countries. They further considered that overusing the 
persecution ground “membership of a particular social group” in these cases 
produced a distinction between “normal” cases and women’s cases, which 
may sustain the stereotype that men “own” the rest of the Convention grounds 
and that only men are “real” refugees.111       
 
1.7 Previous research  
The problems that women encounter when applying for asylum have been 
studied by many authors around the world. Several of these authors are 
referred to above in chapter 1.6. Like this thesis, many of these works apply 
feminist theory. Since there is not enough space in this thesis to go through 
                                                 
108 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 170.  
109 Razack 1995, p. 88; Quoted in Spijkerboer 2000, p. 170.   
110 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 181.  
111 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 171.  
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all of the research that has been done in this area, I will mention two of the 
works that from my point of view are amongst the most important in this field 
of study.  
 
Spijkerboer is one of the most prominent experts on the issue of gender in 
refugee law and the situation for women in the asylum process. I have had 
great use of his dissertation Gender and Refugee Status, where he studies the 
interrelation between gender and refugee law. His focus in this book is on 
Dutch refugee law.  
 
Another important author is Heaven Crawley who has written Refugees and 
Gender: Law and Process. In this book, Crawley aims to ensure that gender-
related aspects of women’s experiences are taken into account. She deals with 
the concepts of gender persecution and provides a gendered framework for 
the interpretation of the key elements of the 1951 Convention. The focus is 
on refugee law in the UK, but she also does a comparative study and 
investigates case law from Canada, the US and Australia.     
 
Unlike these works, my thesis focuses on Swedish refugee law. Maria 
Bexelius has written a comprehensive handbook, Asyl kön och politik, which 
deals with the issue of women and gender in refugee law and human rights 
law in general, with focus on Swedish refugee law.     
 
Due to lack of time and space, this thesis does not study the issue of gender 
and women’s situation in refugee law as extensively as these authors. This 
thesis is limited to investigate one element of the refugee definition, namely 
the persecution grounds. 
 
Kristina Folkelius and Gregor Noll have written about the so called “gender 
provision” in the former Aliens Act. In this work, they studied, amongst other 
things, whether this provision could be considered to meet the requirements 
under CEDAW.   
 
In this thesis, I study the persecution grounds of the current refugee definition, 
which have come to replace the gender provision. I examine whether the 
approach of the Swedish Aliens Act to encompass gender-related persecution 
within the scope of the refugee definition is in accordance with the obligations 
that Sweden is bound to respect under CEDAW. Furthermore, I employ 
feminist theory in order to see what is at stake for women asylum seekers 
depending on how the persecution grounds of the refugee definition are 
designed, justified and applied. 
 
1.8 Delimitations 
Although both women and men can be subjected to gender-related 
persecution, I have chosen to focus on women’s gender-related asylum claims 
in this study. What I mean by “women” in this study are people who identify 
as women and people whose biological sex is female. It should be mentioned 
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that the Swedish term kön which was included in the Swedish refugee 
definition covers, not only to the biological concept of “sex” and the cultural 
and social concept of “gender”, but also transsexuals and transgender people 
in general “insofar the persecution directed at them is due to their attitudes 
regarding gender identity”.112 I will, however, not analyse persecution of 
transsexuals and transgender people in this study. I will also leave out refugee 
claims based on sexual orientation, even though these claims also contain a 
gender element. This means that I will not study the term “persecution for 
reasons of sexual orientation” which, together with kön, was introduced in the 
Swedish refugee definition as an example of what falls within the scope of 
the persecution ground “membership of a particular social group”. 
 
The refugee definition contains several criteria that a person has to fulfil in 
order to qualify for refugee status and some of these elements require a 
gender-sensitive interpretation. I have chosen to focus on the persecution 
grounds of the refugee definition, which are: race, religion, nationality, 
political opinion and membership of a particular social group. My aim is to 
establish how these criteria have been interpreted and applied in order to 
cover gender-related persecution. I thereby leave the interpretation of the 
other criteria to be investigated by others.  
  
The question whether CEDAW should be taken into account in the 
interpretation of the 1951 Convention does not have to be investigated further 
in this essay, since Sweden is State party to both treaties. There is, however, 
a significant support for the view that other human rights instruments, such 
as CEDAW, need to be considered in the application of the 1951 
Convention.113 
 
I have not had enough time and space to examine and present all feminist 
critique of the refugee definition. My aim has therefore not been to present a 
complete description of the feminist critique of refugee law and the refugee 
definition. The feminist critique that I present in chapter 1.6 is painted with a 
broad brush and its objective is limited to providing an overarching view of 
how feminist critique of refugee law has developed and differed during the 
past decades.  
 
The EU member States have committed to establishing the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), which aims to harmonize the asylum 
regulations of the member States “so that asylum seekers, 1951 Convention 
refugees, and beneficiaries of ‘subsidiary protection’ receive the same 
entitlements irrespective of which Member State they find themselves in”.114 
The Qualification Directive115 forms part of the CEAS and contains a refugee 
                                                 
112 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 21 – 22 & 34, authors translation.   
113 McAdam 2011, p. 104 – 108; Hathaway & Foster 2014, p. 9. Stern 2010, p. 297.  
114 McAdam 2011, p. 108.  
115 European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 
April 2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country 
Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International 
Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted, 30 September 2004, OJ L. 304/12-
304/23; 30.9.2004, 2004/83/EC, (Hereafter: Qualification Directive).   
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definition that is based on the refugee definition of 1951 Convention. I have 
therefore not studied the refugee definition of the Qualification Directive, 
although Sweden is bound to it.  
 
1.9 Terminology 
Asylum  
In this essay, the term “asylum” is used in accordance with the Swedish 
Aliens Act116 where it is described as a residence permit that is granted to an 
alien because he or she is a refugee, or in need of subsidiary protection117.  
 
Asylum seeker and asylum applicant  
The terms “asylum seeker” and “asylum applicant” are used in this essay 
when referring to persons who seek protection from persecution or other 
abuses in their country of origin or country of residence, whether they fulfil 
the criteria of the refugee definition or not.   
 
Gender, sex and kön  
In this study, the term sex refers to the biological sex, while the term gender 
is used to describe the relationship between women and men based on socially 
or culturally constructed and defined identities, status, roles and 
responsibilities that are assigned to one sex or another. Hence, the biological 
sex is fixed, while gender is constructed and varies in different cultures and 
can thereby be changed.118 
 
The term kön will be used in accordance with its meaning in the Swedish 
refugee definition. Kön should be understood in a broad meaning to include, 
not only biological sex, but also socially constructed sex (gender).      
 
Gender-specific persecution and gender-related persecution  
The expression gender-specific persecution is used to describe a method of 
persecution that is specific to a given gender. Examples of gender-specific 
forms of persecution that solely, or predominantly, affect women are female 
genital mutilation (FGM), forced abortion, rape and other forms of sexual 
abuse. Gender-specific forms of persecution that men can be subjected to is 
for instance the administration of electric chocks to a man’s testicles.119  
 
Gender-related persecution means that someone risks persecution due to 
reasons that fully or partially are based on notions of gender. For example, a 
women who acts contrary to laws or norms that regulate how a “proper 
woman” should behave may risk gender-related persecution.120  
                                                 
116 Chapter 1 section 3 UtlL.  
117 See chapter 1 section 3 UtlL. In Swedish: alternativt skyddsbehövande.  
118 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 3.  Note that there is no 
universally accepted definition of these terms and that this definition has been theoretically 
contested, see for example Butler 1999.     
119 SOU 2004:31, p. 17.  
120 Crawley 2001, p. 7.  
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It is important to note that gender-specific persecution does not necessarily 
constitute gender-related persecution. A woman may for instance be raped 
(gender-specific persecution) because of her nationality. Conversely, an 
applicant may risk gender-related persecution even though the method of the 
persecution is not gender-specific. An example is when a woman risks being 
flogged (not gender-specific persecution) for refusing to wear a veil (gender-
related persecution).121    
 
Refugee    
A refugee is a person who fulfils the criteria in article 1.A(2) of the 1951 
Convention. 
 
1.10 Structure 
In chapter two, the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol are presented, 
followed by a more thorough presentation of the criteria of the refugee 
definition. Thereafter comes a legal study of how the persecution grounds of 
the 1951 Convention encompass gender-related persecution. Lastly, the 
gender-sensitive interpretation of the persecution grounds is analysed from 
the perspective of different feminist approaches.    
 
In chapter three, a brief introduction to CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee 
is given. After that, I present the statements that the CEDAW Committee has 
made in General recommendation No. 32 concerning the measures that the 
States parties to CEDAW are obliged to follow in the interpretation and 
application of the persecution grounds in order to fulfil its obligations under 
CEDAW. In the following section, I study how the approach of the 1951 
Convention to encompass gender-related persecution within the scope of the 
persecution grounds correspond to the obligations identified by the CEDAW 
Committee. Lastly, I examine whether the statements of the CEDAW 
Committee answers to and/or remains sensitive to the feminist critique that 
has been identified and categorised by Spijkerboer.  
 
In chapter four, the Swedish refugee definition is firstly presented. In the next 
section, I examine Swedish preparatory works and present how gender-
related persecution was approached before the amendment in 2005, the 
reasons for the amendment of the Swedish refugee definition in 2005 and the 
legislative procedure that resulted in the new refugee definition. I also present 
the legislature’s statements in these preparatory works concerning how the 
persecution grounds are interpreted and applied in order to encompass 
gender-related persecution. The meaning of the term kön in the Swedish 
Aliens Act is presented thereafter. After that, I examine what has been stated 
in the preparatory works regarding the legal meaning and coverage of the term 
“persecution on grounds of kön”. Afterwards, the compliance of the Swedish 
approach to encompass gender-related persecution to the 1951 Convention 
                                                 
121 Crawley 2001, p. 8.  
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approach and the obligations of the CEDAW Committee is presented. The 
last section contains the feminist analysis, where it is examined how the 
interpretation of the persecution grounds of the Swedish refugee definition 
answers to and/or remains sensitive to the feminist critique identified by 
Spijkerboer.     
 
In chapter five, the case law that has been studied for the purpose of this thesis 
is presented. After the presentations of the cases, I will analyse the approach 
of the Migration Court of Appeal to encompass gender-related persecution 
and examine whether this is in accordance with the approach of the Swedish 
Aliens Act, the approach of the 1951 Convention and the obligations 
identified by the CEDAW Committee. Lastly, I will examine whether the case 
law of the Migration Court of Appeal answers to, alternatively remains 
sensitive to, the feminist critiques identified by Spijkerboer. 
 
In chapter six, I present my analysis and draw conclusions from the results of 
the thesis.  
 
In chapter seven, some concluding remarks on the thesis is given.   
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2 The 1951 Convention and its 
1967 Protocol    
In this chapter, I will present the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol and 
address the question of what the main elements are of determining who 
qualifies as a refugee. Thereafter, I will examine how the 1951 Convention 
grounds have be interpreted and applied to encompass gender-related 
persecution. Lastly, I will analyse the results of this examination from the 
point of view of the feminist critiques that have been identified and 
categorised by Spijkerboer.  
  
2.1 Background  
The 1951 Convention, together with its 1967 Protocol, remains the central 
instrument in international refugee law.122 The Convention was originally 
designed to solve the post Second World War refugee crisis in Europe. 123 It 
was intended to be applied by Western States in their dealings with arrivals 
from one of the Soviet bloc countries and it largely reflected the international 
politics of the early Cold War era.124 The refugee definition in article 1A(2) 
was initially only applicable to refugees who had fled from events occurring 
before the 1st of January 1951, either only in Europe or in Europe and 
elsewhere in the world. The reason for the 1951 dateline was that the 
contracting States at the time the Convention was adopted wished to “limit 
their obligations to refugee situations that were known to exist at that time, or 
to those which might subsequently arise from events that had already 
occurred”.125 These temporal and geographical limitations were removed by 
the adoption of the 1967 Protocol, which expanded the scope of the 
Convention and made it universal and applicable to contemporary refugees.  
 
The Convention establishes who is to be recognized as a refugee and what 
legal protection, support and social rights a person with refugee status should 
receive from the contracting States.126 Moreover, it specifies who falls outside 
the scope of the Convention and under what circumstances a person ceases to 
be considered a refugee.127  
 
                                                 
122 Diesen et al. 2012, p. 112.  
123 UNHCR Handbook, para. 5.  
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125 UNHCR Handbook, para. 7.  
126 See article 1A, 4, 5, 12 – 34 1951 Convention.       
127 See article 1C and 1F 1951 Convention.  
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The Convention has today a total of 145 States parties, but there is still a 
number of big countries, such as India and the United States of America, that 
have not yet ratified the Convention.128 However, these countries are bound  
to respect those articles in the Convention that have been recognized as norms 
of customary international law. An example is the principle of non-
refoulement, which has been described as the cornerstone in international 
refugee law.129 The principle of non-refoulement imposes a negative duty and 
minimum obligation on States in relation to people that come under its 
jurisdiction. Although it does not respond to the absence of an individual right 
to be granted asylum in international law, 130 it ensures that people that are at 
risk of being persecuted in their country of origin must be allowed to stay, 
even though their asylum application has been denied.  
 
The principle of non-refoulement, as it is established in article 33(1) of the 
Convention, forbids the Contracting States to “expel or return” a refugee in 
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.131 This applies 
to both refugees and asylum seekers, which means that all asylum seekers are 
protected from refoulement both before, during and after their applications 
have been properly examined.132 However, according to article 33(2), there 
are two situations when an exemption can be made from article 33(1). First, 
if there are reasonable grounds for regarding the refugee or asylum seeker as 
a danger to the security of the receiving country. Second, if the refugee or 
asylum seeker has been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly 
serious crime and constitutes a danger to the community in the receiving 
country. However, it is not sufficient to solely apply the 1951 Convention in 
these situations. The principle of non-refoulement is also codified in several 
other international instruments which provide a complementary protection in 
cases where a person falls outside the scope of article 33 of the 1951 
Convention. The provisions in question are: article 3 of the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT), article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), and article 3 of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR).133 Hence, the 
principle of non-refoulement according to international customary law and as 
                                                 
128 UNHCR, State Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and/or 
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it is codified in these instruments must be considered as well in these 
situations.134  
   
2.2 The refugee definition  
The refugee definition in Article 1A(2) is one of the core provisions of the 
1951 Convention. It establishes the criteria that a person has to fulfil in order 
to qualify as a refugee within the meaning of the Convention. According to 
the Handbook, the determination of refugee status is declaratory. This means 
that a person is to be considered a refugee as soon as he or she fulfils the 
criteria set in the refugee definition, which already should have occurred 
before the refugee status was formally admitted by the competent authorities. 
Refugee status is thus not something that is granted by states – it is simply 
recognised by them.135  
 
Article 1A(2) states that the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who: 
 
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951136 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
          
The definition shows that far from all people in the world that have fled their 
homes are considered as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 Convention 
and its 1967 Protocol. For example, internally displaced persons (IDP) fall 
outside the scope of the refugee definition since they are not outside their 
country of origin.137 It should also be noted that a forward-looking assessment 
is made when determining whether a person qualifies for refugee status. This 
means that the person in question does not have to prove that he or she already 
has been subjected to persecution. The focus of the assessment is to determine 
what may happen if the applicant would be sent back to his or her home 
country. Earlier experiences of persecution naturally make out important 
evidence of that the person is at risk of persecution, but such experiences are 
generally not decisive in the determination process.138     
 
Well-founded fear 
The phrase “well-founded fear of being persecuted” is the key phrase of the 
refugee definition.139 The term “well-founded fear” contains a subjective and 
an objective element, which both have to be taken into consideration in the 
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assessment. The subjective element “fear” requires an evaluation of the 
applicant’s statements and behaviour.140 It is crucial that the authorities 
evaluate each applicant’s personality separately, since different individuals 
may not have the same psychological reaction when subjected to the same 
type of treatment.141  
 
The words well-founded refer to that the person in question either already has 
been subjected to persecution or can show good reason why he or she fears 
persecution.142 What the objective element implies is that the applicant’s 
frame of mind must be supported by an objective situation.143 The applicant’s 
statements must be viewed in the context of the relevant background situation, 
which includes the conditions in the country of origin and the applicant’s 
personal experiences. Reports from the UN or human rights organisations, 
such as Amnesty international or Human Rights Watch, can be used in order 
to examine the situation in the country of origin.144 It is also relevant to study 
the laws in the country of origin, and in particular the manner in which they 
are applied. Consideration of the applicant’s personal experiences may also 
include for instance what has happened to his or her friends and relatives. If 
they have been subjected to persecution, it may well show that the applicant’s 
fear that something also will happen to him or her is well-founded.145 
According to the Handbook, an applicant’s fear should in general be 
considered as well-founded “if he can establish, to a reasonable degree, that 
his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable to him for 
the reasons stated in the definition, or would for the same reasons be 
intolerable if he retuned there”.146  
 
Persecution 
The type of treatment that the applicant fears must reach a certain level of 
intensity in order to be considered as persecution. The term “persecution” has 
no universally accepted definition and must therefore be determined based on 
the circumstances in each case. It can nonetheless be presumed from article 
33 of the Convention that threats to life or freedom, or other serious violations 
of human rights, on account of race, nationality, religion, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion would always constitute 
persecution.147 An applicant can also claim that he or she is owing to a well-
founded fear of persecution on “cumulative grounds”. This means that the 
applicant may fear various treatments that, not separately, but taken together 
can be considered to constitute persecution.148 The agents of persecution can 
be both state authorities (for example police or military personnel) and non-
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State actors (for example guerrilla groups, criminal networks or abusive 
partners).149 
 
In order to establish that a person is at risk of being persecuted, it has to be 
shown that the State approves or tolerates such actions, or alternatively is 
unable or unwilling to offer effective protection. Hence, the assessment of 
whether the applicant is at risk of being persecuted includes a determination 
of the State’s ability and willingness to effectively respond to that risk. If the 
claimant can be expected to enjoy national protection, the requirement “fear 
of being persecuted” is not fulfilled.150   
 
In order to assess whether the asylum seeker can obtain effective protection 
in the country of origin requires thorough knowledge about the conditions in 
the country, including its laws and the implementation of the law. For 
example, in many countries where domestic violence is prohibited by law, it 
still is not enforced in practice or taken seriously as a violation of human 
rights. Therefore, it is not sufficient that the country has adopted legislation 
that prohibits certain forms of violence if these rules are not applied or taken 
seriously in practice.151   
 
The causal link “for reasons of” 
The “for reason of” clause establishes that the claimant’s fear of being 
persecuted must be based on one (or more) of the Convention grounds, which 
I present below. The Convention ground does not have to be the sole reason 
for the persecution, but it has to be a relevant contributing factor. The requisite 
“for reasons of” is handled differently in different States. Some jurisdictions 
require that the causal link is explicitly established, while other States do not 
treat the causation as a separate question.152  
 
Establishing a causal link can be particularly difficult in cases where the 
persecutor is a non-State actor. For example, a woman who has been abused 
by her husband may not always be able show that his actions were for reasons 
of her membership of a particular social group or her political opinions. The 
UNHCR has clarified under what circumstances the causal link can be 
considered to be established in cases where a non-State actor performs the 
persecution. First, if an applicant is at risk of being persecuted by for example 
a partner or family member for reasons which are related to one of the 
persecution grounds, regardless of whether the absence of State protection is 
Convention related. Second, if the risk of being persecuted by a non-State 
actor cannot be linked to one of the persecution grounds, but the inability or 
unwillingness of the State to offer effective protection is for reason of one of 
the persecution grounds.153    
 
Internal flight alternative 
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The refugee status determination also includes an assessment of whether there 
is an internal flight alternative in the country of origin. It could be the case 
that the applicant is not considered to be at risk of persecution in the whole 
territory of the country of origin. If it can be shown that the applicant could 
have sought refuge in another part of the country, and he or she could 
reasonably be expected to do so, that person falls outside the scope of the 
definition.154 This is in principle only possible it the persecution has been 
performed by a non-State actor.  
 
Outside country of nationality 
An applicant must be outside the country of his or her nationality in order to 
qualify for refugee status. The term “nationality” refers to citizenship in this 
context. If the applicant’s nationality cannot be established, the assessment 
should be made as if it concerned a stateless person. In such cases, the country 
of former habitual residence is instead taken into account.155  
 
The refugee definition does not require that the person in question left his or 
her country due to his or her fear of persecution. The reason for this is that a 
risk of being persecuted may arise while the applicant is already outside the 
country of origin. A person may for instance become a refugee due to changes 
of the situation in the country of origin during his or her absence. It could also 
be so that a person’s actions outside the country of origin has put him or her 
at risk of being persecuted. A person how was not a refugee when he or she 
left the country of origin but later became one is called a refugee sur place.156 
When assessing whether a person is a refugee sur place, it should be 
considered whether the actions or opinions of the asylum seeker can be 
assumed to have come to the attention of the authorities in the country of 
origin or if there is a risk that this may happen in the future.157        
 
“[A]nd is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country”  
Being unable to avail oneself of the protection of the country of origin refers 
to circumstances that are beyond the applicant’s control. The State authorities 
could for instance be unable to provide protection due to a state of war, civil 
war or other great disturbances.158 The term unwilling means in this context 
that a refugee refuses to accept the protection of the country of origin due to 
his or her well-founded fear of being persecuted. However, if a person would 
claim to be willing to avail herself to the protection of the country of origin, 
it would be incompatible with a claim that she is outside her country “owing 
to a well-founded fear of persecution”. Hence, if there is available state 
protection and there is no ground based on well-founded fear for refusing it, 
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the claimant can not be considered to be in need of international protection.159 
The same applies for stateless refugees.160             
 
The persecution grounds 
As already mentioned, the reason for persecution must be linked to at least 
one of the five persecution grounds listed in the definition: race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. 
According to the UNHCR, a claim can be based on one or a combination of 
two or more of the 1951 Convention grounds. It will thus not be a problem 
for the applicant if the grounds would come to overlap.161 As regards the 
determination of the relevant ground for the claim, it is not the responsibility 
of the applicant, but of the examiner, to analyse the facts of the case, 
determine the reason or reasons for the persecution feared by the applicant 
and thereby determine whether the criteria of the definition are met.162 In the 
following sections, I will turn to how the persecution grounds of the refugee 
definition are to be interpreted. 
 
Race 
The persecution ground “race” should be understood in its widest sense to 
include all kinds of ethnic groups that are referred to as “race” in common 
usage.163 Although the drafters did not specify the meaning of the term, some 
argue that the historical context speaks for the view that the ground was 
introduced to include Jewish victims of the Nazi regime who had been 
persecuted because of their ethnicity but who did not actively practice their 
religion.164 What also speaks for a broad interpretation of the ground is that it 
is consistent with the recognition that “race” is a socially constructed notion 
and with the developments in international human rights law.165  
 
Religion 
The freedom of religion is a deeply rooted principle in international human 
rights law. Religious belief has numerous times throughout history been the 
reason for persecution of individuals and groups.166 The freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion is established in several treaties, such as article 18 
ICCPR and article 9 ECHR. These articles include a right to have and practice 
a religion or belief, but they also include a right to atheism and to not have or 
manifest a religion or belief.167 Persecution for reasons of religious belief may 
according to the Handbook assume various forms, such as prohibition of 
membership of a religious community or serious measures of discrimination 
against persons because they practice their religion or belong to a particular 
religious community.168       
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Nationality  
The term nationality in the refugee definition does not only refer to citizenship 
or former country of residence of a stateless person. It also includes 
membership of an ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic group and it may 
come to overlap with the term “race”.169 This type of persecution may consist 
of adverse attitudes and measures that is aimed towards a national, ethnic or 
linguistic minority. Belonging to such a minority may in certain cases in itself 
give rise to well-founded fear of persecution.170 An example of persecution 
for reasons of nationality is the treatment that the Romani people is subjected 
to in many parts of Europe today.171     
 
Political opinion 
The persecution ground “political opinion” should be interpreted in a broad 
sense and include “any opinion on any matter in which the machinery of state, 
government, and policy may be engaged”.172 This liberal interpretation of 
“political opinion” is supported, not only by the ordinary meaning of the term, 
but also by the drafting history of the 1951 Convention. The drafters of the 
Convention emphasised that “political opinion” was not to be reserved for a 
political elite. They noted that “not only diplomats thrown out of office” or 
“persons whose political party had been outlawed” but also “individuals who 
fled from revolutions” should fall within the scope of the provision.173 
“Political opinion” was consequently given a broad meaning that also 
included members of the general public. The liberal reading of political 
opinion is further confirmed by the way the term, and other related terms, are 
interpreted in other international treaties, such as article 19 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 19 ICCPR, article 4 of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), and article 10 ECHR.174 Hence, membership of a 
political party or association to a political ideology is not necessary to get 
refugee status on this ground.175  
 
Merely holding political opinions contrary to those of the Government is not 
in itself sufficient for claiming refugee status. What the applicant seeking 
refugee status must show is that he or she fears persecution for having 
political opinions that are not tolerated by the authorities and that the opinions 
in questions will or already have come to their attention.176 The persecutor 
may for example be aware of the applicant’s political opinions if he or she 
has expressed them publicly. However, the applicant must not necessarily 
have expressed or acted on his or her convictions, which is confirmed by the 
fact that the Convention uses the term “political opinion” and not “political 
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activity”. 177 It may for example have been impossible to express the opinions 
in question due to the risk of persecution. Another possible scenario is that 
the applicant was not aware of his or her political opinions or felt as strongly 
about them before leaving his or her country of origin.178 The crucial question 
in cases concerning persecution due to political opinion is whether is can be 
presumed that the applicant’s decision to express or act on the opinion in 
question would place him or her at risk of being persecuted upon return to the 
country of origin.179 The applicant must show that his or her opinions are or 
will come to the attention of the persecutor and, as a result of this, lead to 
persecution. Naturally, the more exposed a person’s political opinions are, the 
easier will it be to prove that the persecutor knows about his or her 
opinions.180 Since freedom of expression if one of the most fundamental 
human rights, it would be inappropriate to deny someone refugee status on 
the basis that the applicant can conceal these opinions and keep silent in order 
to avoid persecution.181 
 
The applicant is not required to actually hold the political opinion in question, 
or even a political opinion at all. This is due to the fact that an opinion can be 
wrongly attributed to the applicant by the persecutor.182 Attribution may be 
based on for example a person’s membership of an organisation, family 
connections, ethnicity or engagement in certain activities.183 Even a position 
of neutrality can result in an attribution of a political opinion.184 The 
behaviour or activities that have led to the imputation of the political opinions 
do not have to resemble traditional forms of political engagements. For 
example cooking and providing food or nursing sick rebel soldiers may be 
interpreted as an expression of a political opinion, which is something that I 
will return to later in the section regarding how the persecution grounds 
should be interpreted from a gender perspective. When determining whether 
an imputation of political opinion is likely to be made, the crucial issue will 
be “whether certain behaviour or actions on the part of the applicant are or 
have been perceived by the authorities as political opinion”.185 
  
Another relevant issue concerning the term “political opinion” is how the 
political nature of the opinion or activity in question should be evaluated. This 
could be a rather difficult task since what may be perceived as non-political 
in the State of refuge may be seen as being highly political in the applicant’s 
State of origin. It has been argued in legal doctrine that the different political 
contexts in different countries should be considered.186  
 
Membership of a particular social group 
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The persecution ground “membership of a particular social group” has been 
pointed out as the ground with the least clarity.187 The drafting history 
contains very limited information about the interpretation of this ground, 
probably due to the fact that it was introduced as a last minute amendment to 
the Convention.188 “Membership of a particular social group” would prove to 
be of less practical importance after the adoption of the Convention, but it has 
gained in importance and practical relevance since the 1980s.189  
  
The UNHCR states that there is no exhaustive list of what groups may 
constitute a “particular social group” within the meaning of Article 1A(2). 
The agency recommends that the term should be read in an “evolutionary 
manner”, meaning that is should be “open to the diverse and changing nature 
of groups in various societies and evolving international human rights 
norms”.190     
 
The interpretation of what constitutes a social group within the meaning of 
the Convention has come to vary between the Contracting States. Two 
dominant approaches have been identified by the UNHCR. The first approach 
“examines whether a group is united by an immutable characteristic or by a 
characteristic that is so fundamental to human dignity that a person should 
not be compelled to forsake it”.191 This approach is called “the protected 
characteristics approach”. The immutable characteristic may be innate, such 
as sex or ethnicity, or unalterable for other reasons, such as past association 
or occupation. In order to identify characteristics that are so fundamental to 
human dignity that one should not be required to forego them, one can consult 
human rights norms.192 The second approach is called “the social perception 
approach” and it “examines whether or not a group shares a common 
characteristics which makes them a cognizable group or sets them apart from 
society at large”.193        
 
The UNHCR considers that these two approaches should be reconciled and 
has therefore recommended the following definition of “membership of a 
particular social group”, which incorporates both approaches:  
 
a particular social group is a group of persons who share a common characteristic 
other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by 
society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or 
which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one’s 
human rights.194       
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It is well accepted that the size of the group in question is irrelevant when 
establishing the existence of a particular social group. This applies for the 
other persecution grounds as well.195 The UNHCR also states that “a 
particular social group cannot be defined exclusively by the persecution that 
the members of the group suffer or by a common fear of being persecuted”.196 
However, the persecution may be an important factor in the identification of 
a social group.  
 
The applicant is not required to show that the members of the particular social 
group know or associate with each other. Neither does the applicant have to 
demonstrate that all members of the particular social group are at risk of 
persecution. Other members of the same particular social group may not be 
at risk, for example because the persecutor does not know them.197  
 
2.3 Gender-sensitive interpretation of the 
persecution grounds  
After the examination above of who is to be considered a refugee, we can 
conclude that the wording of the refugee definition does not contain any 
considerations regarding gender aspects in the refugee status assessment. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, the issue of gender was barely 
discussed in the drafting process of the Convention. However, during the past 
decades, increasingly more attention has been brought to the issue of female 
refugees and asylum seekers, largely thanks to the work of transnational 
networks of women’s organisations.198 Today, it is an established principle 
that the refugee definition as a whole should be interpreted with an 
“awareness of possible gender dimensions in order to determine accurately 
claims to refugee status”.199 
 
In order to do a legal study of how the persecution grounds of the 1951 
Convention encompass gender-related persecution, I will examine legal 
doctrine in which State practice has been investigated and study statements 
of the UNHCR on this issue.  
 
As I have mentioned earlier, the UNHCR is amongst other things 
commissioned to provide interpretive guidance on the criteria of the refugee 
definition. The UNHCR has issued several so-called “Guidelines on 
International Protection” to complement its Handbook. The purpose of the 
Guidelines is to clarify how the provisions of the Convention should be 
interpreted and applied by the contracting States, and they are intended to be 
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used by governments, legal practitioners, decision-makers and the judiciary, 
and UNHCR staff in their application of the refugee definition.200    
 
In the Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, the agency acknowledges 
that the refugee definition historically has been interpreted from a male 
perspective and that this has led to that many asylum claims by women have 
gone unrecognized.201 The focus of these Guidelines is therefore to present 
how the criteria of refugee definition should be interpreted from a gender 
perspective. The agency also proposes procedural practices in order to ensure 
that gender-related claims are properly considered in the refugee status 
determination process.202 The key message in these Guidelines is that the 
contracting States should ensure “a gender-sensitive application of refugee 
law” and especially of the criteria of the refugee definition.203  
 
The UNHCR stresses that a gender-sensitive interpretation must be given to 
each of the Convention grounds of the refugee definition when determining 
whether the applicant qualifies for refugee status.204 As demonstrated above, 
the terms sex or gender are not included amongst the Convention grounds in 
the refugee definition. Nevertheless, adding an additional ground to the 
refugee definition is not considered to be necessary by the UNHCR. The 
agency claims that “[e]ven though gender is not specifically referenced in the 
refugee definition, it is widely accepted that it can influence, or dictate, the 
type of persecution or harm suffered and the reasons for this treatment”.205 
The refugee definition, as it is formulated today, already covers gender-
related claims if properly interpreted.206  
 
2.3.1 Race  
According to the UNHCR, persecution for reasons of “race” is not specific to 
women or men. However, the agency notes that: 
 
Persecution for reasons of race may be expressed in different ways against men 
and women. For example, the persecutor may choose to destroy the ethnic identity 
and/or prosperity of a racial group by killing, maiming or incarcerating the men, 
while the women may be viewed as propagating the ethnic or racial identity and 
persecuted in a different way, such as through sexual violence or control of 
reproduction.207   
 
Hence, the UNHCR means that the issue with persecution for reasons of race 
is that the persecution normally is gender-specific, rather than gender-related.      
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2.3.2 Religion   
Regarding persecution for reasons of “religion”, the UNHCR brings up how, 
“[i]n certain States, the religion assigns particular roles or behavioural codes 
to women and men respectively”.208 If a woman breaches the role that has 
been assigned to her, or refuses to follow the behavioural codes, she may be 
perceived as holding unacceptable religious opinions, regardless of what she 
actually believes about religion. If she is at risk of being punished for this 
behaviour, she may, according to the UNHCR, be considered to have a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of religion.209  
 
In addition, the UNHCR has expressed the following remarks regarding “the 
impact of gender on religion-based refugee claims”.210   
 
In some countries, young girls are pledged in the name of religion to perform 
traditional slave duties or to provide sexual services to the clergy or other men. 
They may also be forced into underage marriages, punished for honour crimes in 
the name of religion, or subjected to forced genital mutilation for religious 
reasons. Others are offered to deities and subsequently bought by individuals 
believing that they will be granted certain wishes. Women are still identified as 
“witches” in some communities and burned or stoned to death. These practices 
may be culturally condoned in the claimant’s community of origin but still amount 
to persecution.211            
 
Zimmermann and Mahler have observed that a woman who refuses to wear 
the Islamic veil may be considered to “be persecuted on religious gender-
related grounds”.212 
 
2.3.3 Nationality 
As mentioned earlier, the persecution ground “nationality” should not only be 
understood as “citizenship”, but also as membership of an ethnic, religious, 
cultural or linguistic group213 and it may occasionally overlap with the ground 
“race”.214 Like with “race”, the UNHCR notes that persecution for reasons of 
nationality is not specific to women or men, however, “in many instances the 
nature of the persecution takes a gender-specific form, most commonly that 
of sexual violence directed against women and girls”.215   
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2.3.4 Political opinion 
The UNHCR states that the Convention grounds “political opinion” and 
“religion” tend to overlap in gender-related claims, especially “in the realm 
of imputed political opinion” and when the applicant comes from a society 
“where there is little separation between religious and State institutions, laws 
and doctrines”.216 As already mentioned, political opinion should be 
interpreted in a broad sense “to incorporate any opinion on any matter in 
which the machinery of the State, government, society, or policy may be 
engaged”.217 According to the UNHCR, this also includes opinions as to 
gender roles and “non-conformist behaviour which leads the persecutor to 
impute a political opinion” to the person in question. Against this background, 
the UNHCR claims that “there is not as such an inherently political or an 
inherently non-political activity”. Instead, it is the context of the case that 
ultimately determines its nature.218  
 
The agency points out a number of factors that need to be observed when 
interpreting political opinion in a gender-sensitive way. First, women are 
often excluded from the political elite and less likely than men to engage in 
high profile political activities.219 In many societies, women participate more 
often in so called “low level political activities”, such as nursing sick rebel 
soldiers, hiding people, cooking and providing food or passing messages.220 
Second, the agency stresses that it is important to recognize that women who 
do not wish to engage in certain activities, for example in providing meals to 
government soldiers, may be perceived by the persecutor as holding a 
contrary political opinion and may be subjected to persecution for this 
reason.221 Third, women are often “attributed with political opinions of their 
family or male relatives”222 and may thus be subjected to persecution due to 
men’s political activities. In such cases, the claim may be analysed in the 
context of an imputed political opinion. Alternatively, the claim may be 
analysed as persecution for reason of her membership of a particular social 
group, which then would be the applicant’s family.223  
 
Zimmermann and Mahler mention as an example a woman who is persecuted 
for having shown “opposition to institutionalized discrimination against 
women in society or expressed views in opposition to the predominant social 
or cultural norms, e.g. by refusing to wear the Islamic veil”.224 Under such 
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circumstances, the applicant may be perceived as owing to a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for reasons of her political opinion.225 
 
According to Hathaway and Foster, there is a significant support for the view 
that:  
 
opposition to institutionalized discrimination of women, expressions of 
independence from male social and cultural dominance in society, and refusal to 
comply with traditional expectations of behavior associated with gender (such as 
dress codes and the role of women in the family and society) may all be 
expressions of political opinion. Feminism is a political opinion and may be 
expressed by refusing to comply with societal norms that subject women to 
severely restrictive conditions.226 
 
Hathaway and Foster further note that there has been a general reluctance to 
acknowledge persecution in the private sphere as political, especially 
concerning claims involving “domestic violence, forced marriage, resistance 
to female genital mutilation, and sexual violence”.227 Hathaway and Foster 
refer to a decision on this matter from New Zealand, which has received 
considerable attention.228 The case concerned a claim by a Turkish woman 
who was at risk of being subjected to honour killing due to that she had left 
her husband. The court found that honour is an important value in Turkish 
society and that it enforces rigid control by men over women and their 
sexuality. It further discussed the interpretation of the persecution ground 
political opinion from a gender perspective and finally concluded that 
political opinion was the most relevant ground for the particular case: 
 
In the specific context we are satisfied that the appellant’s assertion of her right 
to life and of her right to control her life was a challenge to the collective morality, 
values, behaviors and codes of the two families and beyond them, of the greater 
“community” of which they are a part. This challenge to inequality and the 
structures of power which support it is plainly “political” as that term is used in 
the Refugee Convention. The appellant’s wish to be liberated from those 
structures is in this context a political opinion. It is for holding that opinion that 
she is at risk. Applying the causation standard discussed earlier, the appellant has 
established that she is at risk of being persecuted “for reasons of” political 
opinion.229     
  
Hence, in this case the Court recognised that private sphere activities, such as 
getting a divorce and expressing a wish to decide over one’s own life, may 
also be perceived as political and thereby developed the interpretation of the 
persecution ground political opinion.   
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2.3.5 Membership of a particular social group   
The UNHCR points out “membership of a particular social group” as the 
persecution ground under which gender-related grounds of persecution most 
often are analysed.230 In 1989, the agency stated the following regarding this 
ground:  
 
States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpretation that 
women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhumane treatment due to their having 
transgressed the social mores of the society in which they live may be considered 
as a ‘particular social group’ within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 
United Nations Refugee Convention.231 
 
Sex can according to the UNHCR properly be within the ambit of the social 
group category and women are pointed out as ”a clear example of a social 
subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics, and who are 
frequently treated differently than men”.232 However, the UNHCR notes that 
the emphasis given to this ground has in some cases resulted in that other 
relevant persecution grounds have been over-looked. The UNHCR therefore 
emphasises that, although women may rightfully be interpreted as 
constituting a particular social group within the meaning of the Convention, 
such an interpretation “cannot render the other Convention grounds 
superfluous”.233 As mentioned earlier, the size of the social group is irrelevant 
and it is not required that the group should be “cohesive or that members of 
it voluntarily associate, or that every member of the group is at risk of 
persecution”.234     
 
Although there is a wide consensus in State practice that women, sex or 
gender may constitute a particular social group within the meaning of the 
Convention, Zimmerman and Mahler have noted that there is a tendency 
within State practice to narrow down social groups of women by adding more 
characteristics.235 This has also been observed by Hathaway and Foster, who 
mean that “there is an unfortunate tendency to formulate overly complicated 
and unnecessarily detailed social groups, rather than simply recognize that in 
most cases it is women qua women that constitutes the relevant social 
group”.236 The authors brought up the following description of a social group, 
made by the Board of Immigration Appeal in the USA, as an example of this 
phenomenon: “young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not 
had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice”.237  
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2.4 Feminist analysis of the gender-
sensitive interpretation of the persecution 
grounds  
A concern of the early critics which the interpretation of the 1951 Convention 
grounds of the UNHCR answers to is that private sphere activities, such as 
cooking, hiding people or refusing to provide meals, may be recognized as 
expressions of a political opinion within the meaning of the refugee 
definition. As mentioned before, the early critics aimed to highlight how the 
experiences of refugee women were different from men and that this was not 
sufficiently recognized in refugee law. They especially emphasized how 
women’s political private sphere activities were not seen as political and 
thereby not considered to be relevant in refugee law.238 This gender-sensitive 
interpretation of the 1951 Convention ground political opinion can be 
criticised from a human rights approach point of view. As Greatbatch argued, 
this type of reasoning assume a “bifurcated version of society” which “roots 
women’s oppression in sexuality and private life, thereby disregarding 
oppression experienced in non-domestic circumstances”. 239 It implies that 
there is a “male-dominated public sphere and women are relegated to the 
private sphere”240, which is presumed to be the site of oppression.241 The 
human rights approach was against how the early critics homogenized the 
experiences of refugee women by erasing the specific context from which the 
asylum seeking women come.242  
 
Much emphasis has been given to the persecution ground “membership of a 
particular social group” in gender-related claims. It has been recognized in 
State practice and by the UNHCR that women may be interpreted as 
constituting a particular social group within the meaning of the refugee 
definition. This answers to the recommendations of the human rights 
approach, which argued that gender-related persecution of women can be 
covered by the ground “membership of a particular social group” by 
considering women as a social group.243 However, this approach is sensitive 
to the critique of the anti-essentialists. They meant that if all persecution of 
women is regarded as persecution because of gender and assessed under the 
social group ground, it may reinforce the view that only men can be 
considered as “real refugees”. More precisely, it may create and sustain the 
stereotype that men “own” the persecution grounds which are not explicitly 
“gendrified”244 and thereby reproduce the distinction between “normal” cases 
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versus “women’s” cases”.245  Hence, women continues to be regarded as a 
deviation from the male norm in refugee law.  
 
Furthermore, there is a tendency in the gender-sensitive interpretation of the 
1951 Convention grounds to emphasise the cultural context refugee women 
come from. The experiences of refugee women are analysed through a 
cultural lens and their problems are located in culture and religion in non-
Western States. For instance, the UNHCR speaks of gender oppression that 
occurs “in certain States” and “in some countries” and that persecution of 
women there may be “culturally condoned”. In addition, it is evident that the 
focus in the gender-sensitive interpretation of the persecution grounds has 
primarily been on traditional, cultural and religious practices affecting women 
in non-Western societies, such as risk of being subjected to FGM or 
persecution for refusing to wear the Islamic veil.   
 
This interpretation implies that gender-related persecution is something that 
only occurs in refugee producing non-Western countries and thereby presents 
Western refugee receiving States as superior and as if gender-related 
persecution does not occur in the Western countries. This can be criticized 
from an anti-essentialist point of view. As mentioned before, the anti-
essentialists argued that the human rights approach, which “relies on 
stereotypes which locate gender oppression in the indigenous cultures of 
Third World”246 was an extension of the legal practice where “women’s 
claims are most likely to succeed when they present themselves as victims of 
dysfunctional, exceptionally patriarchal cultures and states”.247 Hence, when 
applying this interpretation of the 1951 Convention grounds, women must 
present themselves as victims and as “a cultural other”248 in order to be 
granted refugee status. They must fit in to the stereotypes that the refugee 
receiving states impose on them. According to the anti-essentialist, these 
arguments reproduce “the opposition of the West to the Rest”.249        
 
Like the anti-essentialists, the UNHCR shows a scepticism of the emphasis 
that has been given to the persecution ground “membership of a particular 
social group” in gender-related claims. However, the agency does not 
motivate its scepticism in the same way as the anti-essentialists. The UNHCR 
simply states that the emphasis that has been given to this ground has meant 
that other grounds have been over-looked and it is therefore concerned that 
the interpretation of this ground will render the other grounds superfluous. It 
does not bring up the concerns of the anti-essentialists of how an overuse of 
this ground may create and reinforce the stereotype that only men can be 
considered as “real” refugees.  
 
The fact that the persecution ground political opinion has received more 
attention in State practice answers to anti-essentialist recommendations. New 
                                                 
245 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 181.   
246 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169. 
247 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
248 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
249 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 181.  
 50 
Zealand has interpreted a woman’s resistance to live with her ex-husband and 
to be subjected to honour killings as an expression of a political opinion. This 
implies that there is a development towards a broader understanding of the 
political opinion ground, which is what the anti-essentialists advocated. 
Mackling was in favour of an interpretation of “political opinion” which 
equated “resistance to gender oppression with a political opinion”.250 
However, as mentioned before, this decision must be interpreted cautiously 
and it cannot be expected to reflect how the rest of the States parties of the 
Convention interpret the refugee definition. 
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3 CEDAW 
This chapter aims to address the question of what measures the CEDAW 
Committee obliges its contracting States to take in order to fulfil its 
obligations under CEDAW when interpreting and applying the persecution 
grounds of the 1951 Convention. I will first give a brief presentation of 
CEDAW and the CEDAW Committee. After that, I will present the measures 
that the contracting States to CEDAW are obliged to realise. Thereafter, I will 
examine how the approach of the 1951 Convention to encompass gender-
related persecution within the scope of the persecution grounds correspond to 
the obligations identified by the CEDAW Committee. Lastly, I will examine 
whether the statements of the CEDAW Committee answer to and/or remain 
sensitive to the feminist critique that has been identified and categorised by 
Spijkerboer.  
 
3.1 Introduction to CEDAW 
CEDAW, many times described as the international bill of rights for women, 
was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1979 and entered into force in 
1981. Sweden was the first country to ratify CEDAW in 1980 and today it 
has a total of 189 States parties, although many of them have made extensive 
reservations to it.251  
 
CEDAW consists of a preamble and 30 articles, which include a definition of 
what constitutes discrimination against women and an agenda for how to end 
such discrimination. The definition of discrimination against women is 
contained in article 1 of the Convention, which states that “discrimination 
against women” shall mean:  
 
[…] any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has 
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or 
exercise by women, irrespectively of their marital status, on a basis of equality of 
men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. 
 
CEDAW creates far-reaching obligations in relation to gender equality. More 
specifically, it establishes three obligations, which ought to be read as “sub-
objectives” of the overall object and purpose of CEDAW: to eliminate all 
forms of discrimination against women.252 Firstly, the contracting States are 
obliged to “ensure that there is no direct or indirect discrimination against 
women in their laws and that women are protected against discrimination –  
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committed by public authorities, the judiciary, organizations, enterprises or 
private individuals – in the public as well as the private spheres by competent 
tribunals as well as sanctions and other remedies”.253 States parties are thus 
not only obliged to eliminate direct discrimination, but also indirect 
discrimination, which “may occur when laws, policies and programmes are 
based on seemingly gender-neutral criteria which in their actual effect have a 
detrimental impact on women”.254  
 
The contracting States are secondly obliged to “improve the de facto position 
of women through concrete and effective policies and programmes”.255 
Article 4 of CEDAW allows States parties to adopt “temporary special 
measures”, which according to the CEDAW Committee is a central means to 
realise de facto or substantive equality for women.256 
 
Thirdly, States parties must “address prevailing gender relations and the 
persistence of gender-based stereotypes that affect women not only through 
individual acts by individuals but also in law, and legal and societal structures 
and institutions”.257 This obligation is found in article 5(a) of CEDAW, which 
reads as follows:  
 
State Parties shall take all appropriate measures:  
 
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with 
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other 
practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either 
of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women.      
 
While all of these obligations are key to the promotion of women’s rights, the 
latter obligation in article 5 is central to this study for reasons which I will 
explore in the next section.  
 
The members of the Committee are elected by the States parties and serve as 
independent experts that monitor the compliance of the States parties with 
CEDAW and contribute to its interpretation.258 The States parties are required 
to submit regular reports concerning the measures that have been taken in 
order to achieve the goals of CEDAW. The Committee’s mission is to 
consider these reports and address its concerns and recommendations to the 
States parties in the form of concluding observations.259         
      
The Committee has further commitments under the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
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Women,260 which contains two mechanisms to hold governments responsible 
to their obligations under CEDAW: a communications procedure and an 
inquiry procedure. The communications procedure gives individual women 
or groups of women a right to submit claims of violations of rights protected 
under CEDAW before the Committee.261 This presupposes that all national 
remedies already have been exhausted.262 The inquiry procedure enables the 
Committee to initiate inquiries into situations of grave or systematic 
violations of women’s rights.263  
 
Article 21 of CEDAW allows the Committee to make general 
recommendations based on the examination of reports and information 
received from the States parties. The general recommendations are addressed 
to the States parties and usually elaborate the Committee’s view of the 
obligations assumed under the Convention.264 The recommendations can be 
made on any issue that affects women and that the Committee considers 
should be devoted more attention to. Last year, the Committee issued a 
general recommendation which brought up the issue of female refugees and 
asylum seekers and the problems they encounter. This indicates that the 
relevance of gender in asylum claims is still being developed and is 
considered to be an important and current issue. This general 
recommendation is presented in the next section.     
 
CEDAW does not explicitly state whether its provisions apply to all women 
within the States territory or jurisdiction.  However, the Committee has 
established that CEDAW applies to both citizens and non-citizens: 
 
Although subject to international law, States primarily exercise territorial 
jurisdiction. The obligations of States parties apply, however, without 
discrimination both to citizens and non-citizens, including refugees, asylum-
seekers, migrant workers and stateless persons, within their territory or effective 
control, even if not situated within the territory. States parties are responsible for 
all their actions affecting human rights, regardless of whether the affected persons 
are in their territory.265 
 
Furthermore, the fact that the Committee has issued several documents 
concerning for example trafficked women, female migrant domestic workers, 
unaccompanied or undocumented female children and asylum seekers (which 
I will present in the next section below), speaks for the view that the 
Committee has based its works “on an assumption of broad applicability”.266 
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My point of departure is therefore that CEDAW, in relation to a State party, 
covers all women and not only women who are citizens. 
 
3.2 Interpretation and application of the 
persecution grounds in accordance with 
CEDAW  
In 2014, the Committee adopted a new general recommendation, namely 
General recommendation No. 32 on the gender-related dimensions of refugee 
status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women, which situates 
CEDAW within the context of the 1951 Convention. All women in need of 
international protection under the 1951 Convention are covered by this 
general recommendation.267 The Committee expressed that its aim was to 
ensure that the States parties fulfil their obligations under CEDAW in their 
dealings with asylum seekers and stateless women:      
 
Through the present general recommendation, the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women aims to provide authoritative guidance to States 
parties on legislative, policy and other appropriate measures to ensure the 
implementation of their obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Optional Protocol thereto 
regarding non-discrimination and gender equality relating to refugee status, 
asylum nationality and statelessness of women.268    
 
In this general recommendation, the Committee made several references to 
the statements of the UNHCR regarding gender-related persecution. Like the 
UNHCR, the Committee was concerned that claims of female applicants in 
many asylum systems continue to be assessed through the lens of male 
experiences and that this may result in that their claims are not properly 
assessed or even rejected. It further recognized that the refugee definition of 
the 1951 Convention covers gender-related claims if properly assessed and 
emphasized that “asylum procedures that do not take into account the special 
situation or needs of women can impede a comprehensive determination of 
their claims”.269 
 
As regards the interpretation and application of the persecution grounds, the 
Committee pointed out three measures that the States parties are 
recommended to implement in order to fulfill its obligations under CEDAW: 
First, States parties are required to take proactive measures to ensure that all 
of the persecution grounds in the refugee definition are interpreted in a 
gender-sensitive manner.270  
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Second, the States parties to CEDAW are encouraged to add sex and/or 
gender, as well as the reason of being lesbian, bisexual or transgender, and 
other statuses to the list of grounds for refugee status in their national 
legislation and policies relating to refugees and asylum seekers.271  
 
Third, States parties may use gender as a factor in recognizing membership 
of a particular social group. However, the Committee stressed that the 
frequent application of “membership of a particular social group” in women’s 
claims for refugee status may result in a reinforcement of “the stereotyped 
notions of women as dependent victims”.272 With this in mind, the Committee 
highlighted that States parties are obligated under article 5 of CEDAW to 
“assess women’s claims to asylum without prejudice and stereotyped notions 
of women that are based on the inferiority or superiority of either sex”.273 The 
Committee stated that “[g]ender stereotyping affects the right of women to a 
fair and just asylum process and the asylum authorities must take precautions 
not to create standards that are based on preconceived notions of gender-
based violence and persecution”.274  
 
3.3 Correspondance between the 
obligations of the CEDAW Committee and 
the 1951 Convention approach to 
encompass gender-related persecution   
As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the UNHCR has stated that each of 
the persecution grounds must be given a gender-sensitive interpretation when 
determining whether an applicant qualifies for refugee status.275 According to 
the UNHCR, it is not necessary to add an additional persecution ground to the 
refugee definition, since it is accepted that gender can influence or dictate the 
reason for the persecution. Hence, if properly interpreted, the refugee 
definition can cover different types of gender-related persecution.276  
 
Moving on to the statements of the CEDAW Committee, we can see that the 
General recommendation No. 32 echoes the statements made by the UNHCR 
regarding gender-related persecution. Like the UNHCR, The Committee 
emphasizes that each of the Convention grounds must be interpreted in a 
gender-sensitive manner and that gender and sex may be used as a factor in 
recognizing a membership of a particular social group within the meaning of 
the refugee definition. Like the UNHCR, the CEDAW Committee is sceptical 
of the emphasis that has been given to “membership of a particular social 
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group”. For this reason, the Committee clarifies that the States parties are 
obliged under article 5 of CEDAW to assess women’s claims to asylum 
without prejudice and stereotyped notions. 277   
 
Furthermore, the Committee shows an aspiration to include a special 
persecution ground for women. This is manifest in the recommendation to 
add sex and/or gender as grounds for refugee status in the national legislation 
of the contracting States.278 It is thus in accordance with CEDAW to add an 
additional persecution ground into the national legislation in order to 
encompass gender-related persecution. Hence, unlike the UNHCR, it appears 
as if the Committee in its interpretation of the persecution grounds does not 
consider that they may fully encompass all types of gender-related 
persecution and therefore recommends an additional ground to be added.   
 
3.4 Feminist analysis of the obligations of 
the CEDAW Committee  
The obligation to add sex and/or gender as persecution grounds into the 
national refugee definition is in accordance with the recommendations of the 
early critics, who argued that a specific ground should be included in order to 
cover the oppression of women. However, this approach is sensitive to the 
critique by the anti-essentialists, since they believed that it may reinforce the 
view that the persecution grounds which are not “gendrified” are only 
applicable to men. As a consequence, men continue to be regarded as “real” 
refugees. The anti-essentialists opposed how this reinforced the distinction 
between “women’s asylum claims” and “other asylum claims”.    
 
The Committee did not emphasise any particular culture or tradition where 
women are subjected to persecution. Neither did it bring up any examples of 
persecution of women in non-Western Countries. The only concern of the 
human rights approach that the Committee addressed is that gender may be 
used as a factor in recognizing a membership of a particular social group 
within the meaning of the refugee definition, which was the ground that the 
human rights approach preferred to be used on gender-related claims.   
 
Like the anti-essentialists, the CEDAW Committee is critical of how 
women’s asylum claims are regularly assessed under “membership of a 
particular social group”. The Committee means that this may reinforce the 
stereotyped notion of women as dependent victims. According to the 
Committee, the contracting States are obliged under article 5 “to assess 
women’s claims to asylum without prejudice and stereotyped notions of 
women that are based on the inferiority or superiority of either sex” and must 
“take precautions not to create standards that are based on preconceived 
notions of gender-based violence and persecution”.279  This is in line with the 
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critique of postcolonial feminism, which opposed how Third World women 
are described as a homogeneous powerless group.280 Furthermore, it answers 
to the concern of the anti-essentialists, which were against “legal practice in 
which women’s claims are most likely to succeed when they present 
themselves as victims of dysfunctional, exceptionally patriarchal cultures and 
states”.281 The anti-essentialist also opposed the overuse of the persecution 
ground “membership of a particular social group” in women’s asylum claims, 
since it may reinforce the distinction between women’s asylum claims and 
other asylum claims and thereby imply that women cannot be regarded as 
“real” refugees.282  
 
To conclude, the obligations under CEDAW which the CEDAW Committee 
has established answer to all of the categories of feminist critique identified 
by Spijkerboer. However, the fact that the Committees expresses a concern 
of the use of “membership of a particular social group” in gender-related 
claims and of how women refugees are presented as dependent victims 
indicates that it moves towards a more anti-essentialist thinking.     
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4 Swedish refugee law 
As mentioned in the introduction, the issue of gender-related persecution was 
brought up in connection with the adoption of the new Aliens Act283 in 2005. 
This chapter aims to study how the persecution grounds of the Swedish Aliens 
Act encompass gender-related persecution. I will do this by examining the 
Swedish refugee definition in the Aliens Act and preparatory works. 
Furthermore, I will examine what the legal meaning and coverage of the term 
“persecution on grounds of kön” is. In order to understand the legal meaning 
of this term, I will present the discussions and proposals that were made 
during the legislative procedure of the new refugee definition. I will also 
explain the meaning of the term kön. Thereafter, I will examine the 
compliance of the Swedish approach to encompass gender-related 
persecution to the 1951 Convention approach and the obligations of the 
CEDAW Committee. Lastly, I aim to analyse whether the interpretation of 
the persecution grounds of the Swedish refugee definition answers to and/or 
remains sensitive to the feminist critique identified by Spijkerboer.     
 
4.1 The Swedish refugee definition  
Sweden has adopted both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol and is 
thereby bound under international law to respect their provisions. The 
regulation in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol is thus directly 
relevant to the content of Swedish refugee law.284 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, Sweden is also bound to respect the provisions of CEDAW 
in the asylum process.   
  
The refugee definition is incorporated in chapter 4 section 1 of the Swedish 
Aliens Act. A refugee, within the meaning of the Aliens Act, “is an alien who 
is outside the country of his or her nationality, because he or she feels well-
founded fear of persecution on grounds of race, nationality, religious or 
political belief or on grounds of kön,285 sexual orientation or other 
membership of a particular social group, and is unable, or because of his or 
her fear is unwilling, to avail himself or herself to the protection of that 
country”.286 This applies irrespective of whether the persecution is performed 
by State or non-State actors. The Swedish refugee definition is also applicable 
to stateless aliens, whose need for protection is assessed in relation to the 
previous place of residence. An applicant who fulfils the criteria of the 
refugee definition can be granted a residence permit according to chapter 5 
section 1 of the Aliens Act.  
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4.2 Persecution on grounds of kön 
4.2.1 Background 
Before the terms kön and sexual orientation were added to the Swedish 
refugee definition in 2005, refugee status could not be granted solely on these 
grounds. An asylum seeker who had a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
on account of his or her kön or sexual orientation was thus not considered to 
be a refugee in Sweden. Instead, people who were at risk of persecution on 
grounds of kön or homosexuality could be granted a residence permit, first on 
“humanitarian grounds”,287 and after an amendment in 1997 under the so-
called “gender provision” in chapter 3, section 3, first paragraph, point 3 
concerning “persons otherwise in need of protection”.288  
 
In connection with the adoption of the provision concerning “persons 
otherwise in need of protection”, it was explicitly stated in the preparatory 
works that kön could not constitute a membership of a particular social group 
within the meaning of the refugee definition. 289 This meant that kön could 
only be considered under the persecution grounds race, nationality, religion 
or political opinion.290 More precisely, the government expressed in these 
preparatory works that an interpretation of the ground membership of a 
particular social group which meant that “women in general would be 
considered to belong to a specific social group”291 would be “very 
extensive”,292 but it acknowledged that the UNHCR had expressed support 
for this view. However, the legislator found reasons to believe that the 
majority of the EU member States would not accept such an interpretation of 
the ground membership of a particular social group. As a result, the legislator 
concluded that people who were at risk of persecution on grounds of kön or 
homosexuality should be granted protection as “persons otherwise in need of 
protection” and not as refugees.293 The legislator further emphasized that 
Sweden should not apply the Convention in a way that would “significantly 
deviate from the application in other countries”.294 
 
After the adoption of the provision concerning “persons otherwise in need of 
protection”, the international interpretation of the persecution ground 
membership of a particular social group was expanded to include persecution 
on grounds of kön. Several States recognized that people who were at risk of 
persecution for reasons of kön or sexual orientation could qualify for refugee 
status. As presented above, the UNHCR stated in its Handbook and 
Guidelines that women may constitute a particular social groups within the 
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meaning of the Convention.295 Furthermore, the interpretation changed within 
the EU by the adoption of the Qualification Directive.296 In this directive, it 
is explicitly stated that “a particular social group might include a group based 
on a common characteristic of sexual orientation” and that “gender related 
aspects might be considered, without by themselves alone creating a 
presumption for the applicability of this Article”.297  
 
The Government appointed an inquiry which was tasked to “make 
recommendations as to the legislative changes necessary to permit individuals 
who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted on account of their gender 
or sexual orientation to be regarded as refugees under the 1951 Geneva 
Convention”.298 Its primary mission was to expand the Swedish application 
of the refugee definition by clarifying in the Aliens Act that a person who 
risks persecution for reasons of kön or sexual orientation can qualify as a 
refugee.299   
 
Due to the fact that the wording of the Swedish refugee definition was almost 
identical to the refugee definition of the 1951 Convention, the inquiry 
concluded that the wording of the Swedish refugee definition already 
permitted an interpretation which encompassed persecution for reasons of kön 
or sexual orientation. Therefore, a removal of the gender provision in chapter 
3, section 3, first paragraph, point 3 concerning “persons otherwise in need of 
protection” was considered sufficient in order to include persecution for 
reasons of kön into the refugee definition. The benefit of this solution was that 
the Swedish refugee definition and the refugee definition of the 1951 
Convention would remain almost identical.300 However, as mentioned above, 
it had been stated in former preparatory works that kön or sexual orientation 
could not be considered under the ground “membership of a particular social 
group” and thereby not constitute a basis for refugee status. Therefore, the 
inquiry considered it to be more appropriate that the expanded application of 
the refugee definition was explicitly clarified in the Aliens Act. Another 
argument in favour of this solution was that the Swedish legislator is not 
allowed to change the application of the law through the preparatory work. 
Consequently, a change in the application of the law requires explicit support 
in the law.301  
 
Against this background, the inquiry suggested that it be explicitly stated in 
the Aliens Act that, “when an application for asylum is examined, it shall be 
taken into account that persecution which has its basis in an alien’s gender or 
sexual orientation can constitute a ground for refugee status”.302 This wording 
was aimed to clarify that gender-related persecution could also be covered 
by the other persecution grounds, depending on the circumstances, and that 
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the ground “membership of a particular social group” was not the only 
applicable ground on cases involving gender-related persecution. The 
inquiry was concerned that an extensively detailed regulation would prevent 
an evolutionary interpretation of the refugee definition and therefore 
suggested that “it should be left to the authorities responsible for applying the 
law to develop the more specific criteria for the interpretation of this 
provision”.303  
 
Furthermore, the inquiry proposed that “when an application for asylum is 
examined, the basic approach should be first to determine whether the 
persecution is attributable to the applicant’s race, nationality, religion or 
political opinion, and only subsequently [my italics] to determine whether the 
ground membership of a particular social group is applicable”.304 By this 
approach, the inquiry intended to prevent a discriminatory application of the 
persecution grounds. Moreover, the fact that the ground “membership of a 
particular social group” was included with the purpose to complement the 
other grounds was considered to indicate that the grounds should be assessed 
in such order.305 
 
The government emphasized in the preparatory works that it was 
internationally accepted that the 1951 Convention should be given a broader 
interpretation than before, and especially the Convention ground 
“membership of a particular social group”.306 Therefore, it considered it to be 
of great importance that the refugee definition was reformed in accordance 
with internationally drafted and accepted definitions and guidelines.307 
Furthermore, it had been noted that the gender provision  concerning “persons 
otherwise in need of protection” 308  had been applied to a very limited extent 
in cases concerning persecution on grounds of kön or homosexuality. Most 
applicants invoking persecution on these grounds, and granted a residence 
permit, were instead given this under the provision of “humanitarian 
grounds”, or on grounds other than kön or homosexuality in the provision 
concerning “persons otherwise in need of protection”.309 
  
The government agreed with the inquiry’s proposal to remove the gender 
provision concerning “persons otherwise in need of protection”310 and to 
explicitly state in the Aliens Act that the application of the refugee definition 
was now expanded. However, it rejected the more general wording that the 
inquiry had suggested. The government emphasized that it should be clear by 
the text of the Aliens Act that the grounds kön and sexual orientation were 
moved from the gender provision concerning “persons otherwise in need of 
protection” to the refugee definition and that a person who was at risk of 
persecution on these ground from now on would qualify for refugee status. It 
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was for this reasons that the current refugee definition in chapter 4 section 1 
was adopted, where the terms kön and sexual orientation are stated as 
examples of such characteristics that may constitute a membership of a 
particular social group.311  
 
As I have mentioned earlier, the UNHCR has emphasized that the 
interpretation of the persecution ground “membership of a particular social 
group” cannot render the other Convention ground superfluous in gender-
related claims. This was also highlighted by the legislator in the preparatory 
works.312 The legislator brought up how gender-related persecution in many 
cases may fall within the scope of the other convention grounds, especially 
“religion” or “political opinion”, and that more than one ground may be 
applicable at the same time. The statements made by the UNHCR regarding 
how the other Convention grounds should be interpreted in a gender-sensitive 
manner to include gender-related persecution were also brought up in the 
preparatory works.313 
 
The inquiry’s suggestion that the persecution grounds should be assessed in 
a particular order was not echoed by the legislator. The legislator stated that 
the persecution grounds are equivalent to each other and that they all should 
be considered, in no particular order, when an applicant claims that he or she 
is at risk of persecution for reasons of kön or sexual orientation.314 Since one 
persecution ground may be more relevant than another and more than one 
ground can be applicable at the same time, the legislator underlined that it 
may be necessary to assess the asylum claim in relation to each of the 
persecution grounds in order to find the most relevant persecution ground and 
to establish a clear case law. Like the inquiry, the legislator concluded that it 
must be left to the competent authorities to develop the interpretation of the 
persecution ground membership of a particular social group with support 
from the preparatory works and international guidelines.315 
 
The adoption of the new refugee definition resulted in that the Swedish 
refugee definition now has a different wording compared to the definition of 
the 1951 Convention. The legislator argued in the preparatory works that 
although the amendment brought new criteria to the refugee definition, these 
criteria were not new in relation to how the definition was interpreted 
internationally. It further stated that it considered the amendment to be a 
codification of the Guidelines issued by the UNHCR concerning the 
interpretation of “membership of a particular social group”.316   
 
To conclude, kön may, alone or in combination with other characteristics, 
constitute a membership of a particular social group and a person who seeks 
protection from such persecution may now qualify for refugee status on this 
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ground. Gender-related persecution may thus be considered under all of the 
persecution grounds in the Swedish refugee definition. In the following 
sections, it will be explained why the term kön was chosen and what type of 
asylum claims it is intended to cover.   
 
4.2.2 The term kön   
The Swedish legislator chose to include the term kön in the Swedish refugee 
definition instead of the term genus, which is what the English term gender 
as a rule is translated into. This decision was in accordance with the 
recommendation made by the inquiry.317    
 
The term kön has been used in Swedish legislation to describe, not only the 
biological concept of “sex”, but also the social and cultural concept of 
“gender”.318 According to the inquiry, the term genus has a different meaning 
in Swedish compared to the English term gender and it therefore considered 
this term to be more suitable for academic than for legislative purposes.319 
The inquiry also found it to be difficult to determine how an inclusion of the 
term genus would affect the application of other rules where the term kön 
already had been used. As a result, it was considered to be more appropriate 
to continue using the term kön in Swedish law instead of introducing genus 
as a new term in the refugee definition.320  
 
The government emphasized in the preparatory work that the term kön in the 
refugee definition should be used in its broadest sense and thereby include, 
not only biological differences between men and women, but also socially 
and culturally determined notions regarding the behaviour of men and 
women. The term kön also includes transsexuals and transgender people in 
general “insofar as the persecution directed at them is due to their approach 
to gender identity”.321   
 
4.2.3 Kön as “membership of a particular social 
group”  
Kön may, alone or together with other characteristics, constitute a 
membership of a particular social group and it can thereby be described as a 
subcategory to this persecution ground. Consequently, in order to understand 
the meaning of “persecution on grounds of kön”, we must examine the 
statements in the preparatory works regarding the interpretation of 
“membership of a particular social group”.         
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In its reasoning regarding the interpretation of “membership of a particular 
social group”, the legislator made direct references to the statements made by 
the UNHCR in its Handbook and Guidelines on this issue.322 It was also 
established that the Swedish authorities should seek further guidance for the 
interpretation of the ground “membership of a particular social group” in the 
Handbook and Guidelines by the UNHCR and in the Qualification directive. 
 
The legislator further explained in the preparatory works how kön may 
constitute membership of a particular social group in different ways, 
depending on the circumstance.323 In accordance with the recommendations 
by the UNHCR,324 the legislator stated that a social group within the meaning 
of the Convention may consist of people who share an immutable 
characteristic. It could be a characteristic that they were born with or cannot 
change, such as sex, sexual orientation, appearances or disability. A 
characteristic may also be immutable because it originates from historical 
circumstances, such as former membership of an organization.325 
 
Other characteristics that according to the legislator may constitute a 
membership of a particular social group are “those that are fundamental to an 
individual’s identity, conscience or practice of human rights and are rooted in 
the individual’s beliefs or sense of human value”.326 People that due to their 
personal beliefs have chosen a lifestyle that differs from those that are 
accepted by society, such as women who wish to stay unmarried or to work, 
are placed under this category. If their inability or unwillingness to conform 
to such social norms is not perceived as an expression of a political opinion 
or a religious belief, the persecution may instead be for reasons of a 
membership of a particular social group. The social group in question may 
then consist of “people that due to their beliefs refuse to comply with the 
societal norms on gender roles and because of this are subjected to 
persecution”.327 A social group may also consist of individuals who are 
perceived in society as being different. 
 
The legislator further clarified that although the characteristic does not have 
to be immutable or related to personal belief, it must be of such importance 
to its members that it would be incompatible with the grounds of the 1951 
Convention to require them to forsake the characteristic in question and adapt 
to the norms and values of the society.328  
 
Lastly, the legislator stated that membership of a particular social group may 
be based on a combination of characteristics, such as gender identity in 
conjunction with the exercise of the right to decide if and with whom one 
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wants to have a family, or the right not to be forced to submit to surgical 
procedures.329    
 
In addition to these general statements by the legislator, the inquiry presented 
a few examples in order to illustrate how the competent authorities should 
reason when assessing whether an applicant can be considered to belong to a 
social group within the meaning of the refugee definition.  
 
First, the inquiry noted that a social group may consist of people who have in 
common that they are subjected to discrimination since they often, but not 
always, share a certain characteristic. Women who live in countries where 
there is a wide gender gap and where they do not have the same legal rights 
as men were given as an example. The inquiry stressed that “the mere fact 
that these persons are subjected to discrimination cannot define them as a 
social group”,330 however, the discriminatory measures may help to identify 
a group of people that are discriminated because they all share a common 
characteristic. This certain characteristic, which is the reason why the 
members of the group are discriminated, then becomes the point of departure 
in the assessment of whether there exists a social group within the meaning 
of the refugee definition.331  
 
The inquiry further stated that women and girls who are at risk of being 
subjected to FGM are, with no doubt, considered to be members of a 
particular social group within the meaning of the Convention. FGM is said to 
be “a clear example of such inhumane treatment which is referred to in article 
3 ECHR and CAT”.332 “The biological sex is an innate and immutable 
characteristic and the right to keep ones genitals intact is a human right that 
no one should be required to forsake”.333 The inquiry further noted that “a 
woman is subjected to FGM because she is not circumcised or because 
tradition requires her to redo it, for example prior to her marriage”.334 There 
is for this reason considered to be a clear causal link between the risk of being 
subjected to FGM and a membership of a particular social group.335     
 
The issue of forced marriages was also brought up. The inquiry noted that an 
applicant may claim that she has a well-founded fear of being forced into 
marriage or of the consequences of staying in a marriage which she was 
forced into. The inquiry argued that “it generally is the woman/girl who has 
the most vulnerable position in arranged marriages” and that they in some 
cases “are treated as commodities”.336 It was underlined that a woman who 
refuses to carry out the arrangement or manages to get a divorce may be 
punished in different ways. If a woman has a well-founded fear of being 
forced into a marriage, and she cannot enjoy protection against this in her 
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home country, the following reasoning can, according to the inquiry, be 
applied when examining if the social group ground is applicable. 
  
The woman risks persecution due to the fact that she is a woman that already has 
been/ is at risk of being married to someone against her will. Other women with 
the same background are in the same situation and they run such risk as well 
precisely because they are unmarried women or women that are forced to live in 
a marriage that they have not chosen to enter.337  
 
For this reason, women/girls who risk forced marriage may constitute a 
particular social group within the meaning of the Convention according to the 
inquiry.338  
 
The inquiry examined whether there is a causal link between the risk of being 
subjected to honour killings and the ground membership of a particular social 
group. According to the inquiry, honour killings should not be regarded as “a 
personal vendetta between the persecutor and the victim, but rather as an 
unacceptable phenomenon which is supported by the norms and traditions of 
the society in question”.339 The inquiry chose to focus on honour killings 
where the victim, “who normally is a woman, has not behaved in accordance 
with what the tradition prescribes”.340 It further states that “[i]n order to avoid 
the risk of being murdered, a woman must act in accordance within the 
existing norms of her society or family”.341 If she would fail to do so, for 
example by refusing to enter into an arranged marriage, and for this reason 
has a well-founded fear of persecution, it can reasonably be claimed that she 
belongs to “a particularly vulnerable group in society”.342 What the members 
of the group have in common is that they are women who “according to others 
act outside the frames of what is considered to be an acceptable behaviour for 
women and for this reason are at risk of honour killings”.343 The inquiry 
finally concluded that women who are at risk of being subjected to honour 
killings could constitute a particular social group.344  
   
One last example that was discussed was cases involving domestic violence. 
The inquiry described domestic violence in the following manner. “The 
reason why a woman is subjected to serious abuses (persecution) because she 
has been unfaithful or is accused of have being unfaithful has of course many 
different explanations. The main reason and driving force of the persecution 
is normally jealousy and the persecution is generally performed by the 
woman’s current partner or ex-partner”.345 The inquiry considered it to be 
farfetched to claim that such treatment, which was based on accusations of 
unfaithfulness, was for reasons of her membership of a particular social 
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group. Instead, the crucial question was said to be if and why the authorities 
are unable or unwilling to protect the applicant. Assuming that no protection 
can be expected in the country of origin and that the lack of protection is due 
to general reluctance, inefficiency or lack of resources, the claimant can not 
be considered to be persecuted for reasons of her membership of a particular 
social group. However, if it can be shown that the State is unable or unwilling 
to protect her due to the fact that she is a women, her chances to gain refugee 
status improve significantly. The inquiry stated that in “countries where the 
discrimination of women is particularly severe”, it often reflects on the 
legislation and “it is not unusual that the police refuses to deal with cases 
where a woman has reported her husband’s abuses”.346  
 
The inquiry concluded that “women who are persecuted due to that they are 
accused of having an affair may under certain circumstances be considered to 
belong to a particular social group within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention”.347 It emphasized that a direct causal link must be established 
between the persecution and the ground membership of a particular social 
group, and the reason why the State is unable or unwilling to protect the 
applicant generally becomes crucial in this assessment. To establish such a 
link almost always presupposes that the State’s inability or unwillingness to 
protect the applicant derives from a view of women that is “strongly 
discriminating”.348 The inquiry finally stated that if these circumstances can 
be established, then “the explanation for the persecution can be said to be the 
fact that the victim is a woman who lives in a society where the power 
structure supports the principle that a woman has a lower status than men and 
therefore is unable to invoke State protection against persecution”.349 
 
4.3 Correspondance between the Swedish 
Aliens Act approach and the 1951 
Convention approach and the obligations 
of the CEDAW Committee 
To summarize the approach of the Swedish Aliens Act to encompass gender-
related persecution, it is clear from the preparatory works that the Swedish 
legislator recognizes that all of the persecution grounds may encompass 
gender-related persecution, depending on the circumstances,350 and that they 
all should be considered, in no particular order, when an applicant claims 
that he or she is at risk of persecution for reasons of kön.351 Hence, although 
the focus of the amendment was to expand the interpretation of the ground 
“membership of a particular social group” so that kön could be considered 
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under this ground, the Swedish legislator did not aim to give priority to this 
ground in gender-related claims.  
 
Comparing this approach to the 1951 Convention approach, as interpreted by 
the UNHCR, it can fairly be claimed that they are in accordance with each 
other. It was even explicitly expressed that the amendment was considered to 
be a codification of the Guidelines of the UNHCR concerning membership of 
a particular social group.352 The preparatory works also referred to the 
Guidelines of the UNHCR when stating that gender-related persecution may 
be covered by all of the persecution grounds, depending on the 
circumstances.353 As mentioned earlier, the UNHCR has expressed how each 
of the persecution grounds can be interpreted in a gender-sensitive manner to 
encompass gender-related persecution and these statements were also echoed 
in the preparatory works.354  
 
As already mentioned, the CEDAW Committee also advocated that each of 
the persecution grounds should be interpreted in a gender-sensitive way and 
that gender could be considered under “membership of a particular social 
group”. The approach of the Swedish Aliens Act can therefore be considered 
to be in accordance with the obligations stated by the CEDAW Committee. 
However, it also deserves mentioning that while the inquiry brought up 
important and relevant examples of gender-related persecution, it also made 
many questionable statements, especially regarding domestic violence. The 
inquiry’s description of domestic violence is particularly noteworthy since it 
holds the applicant partially responsible for being persecuted.355 The inquiry 
takes the perspective of the persecutor and thereby ignores how the applicant 
experiences the persecution. Against this background, it can be argued that 
the description provided by the inquiry regarding domestic violence does not 
meet the requirements that were stated by the CEDAW Committee 
concerning how the contracting States of CEDAW must avoid to “create 
standards that are based on preconceived notions of gender-based violence 
and persecution”.356   
 
4.4 Feminist analysis of the gender-
sensitive interpretation of the persecution 
grounds of the Swedish Aliens Act 
Like the authors of the human rights approach, the preparatory works 
primarily highlighted traditional, cultural and religious practices affecting 
women in developing countries and Third World countries when describing 
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which types of gender-related persecution that can be encompassed by the 
term “persecution on grounds of kön”. The examples of persecution of women 
that were brought up involved FGM, forced marriage and honour killings.357 
As mentioned earlier, this type of reasoning can be criticized from an anti-
essentialist perspective as well as from a postcolonial feminist perspective. 
By emphasizing such examples of gender-related persecution in the 
interpretation of the persecution grounds, it implies that gender-related 
persecution only happens in the Third World and thereby demonises non-
Western countries. The refugee receiving countries of the West are presented 
as emancipated and superior to the non-Western countries. This type of 
reasoning reproduces the distinction between the Western and the non-
Western countries.358  Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the anti-essentialists 
considered the human rights approach to be “an extension of legal practice in 
which women’s claims are most likely to succeed when they present 
themselves as victims of dysfunctional, exceptionally patriarchal cultures and 
states”.359 This means that women must present themselves as defenceless 
victims in order to qualify for refugee status. There are several statements in 
the preparatory works which indicate that this approach has been adopted, for 
example the statements of how “it generally is the woman/girl who has the 
most vulnerable position in arranged marriages” and of how women “are 
treated as commodities”.360  
 
 
                                                 
357 SOU 2004:31, p. 121 – 125.   
358 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 171.  
359 Spijkerboer 2000, p. 169.  
360 SOU 2004:31, p. 123, authors translation. 
 70 
5 Judicial application 
In this chapter, I will present four cases involving gender-related persecution 
that have been tried at the Migration Court of Appeal. These cases have been 
chosen from the databases Karnov and Zeteo. To find these cases, I used the 
search terms ”könsrelaterad förföljelse” and ”förföljelse på grund av kön”. 
After the presentations of the cases, I will address the question of whether 
the approach to encompass gender-related persecution in the case law of the 
Migration Court of Appeal is in accordance with the approach of the Swedish 
Aliens Act, the approach of the 1951 Convention and the obligations 
identified by the CEDAW Committee. Lastly, I will examine whether the case 
law of the Migration Court of Appeal answers to, alternatively remains 
sensitive to, the feminist critiques identified by Spijkerboer. 
 
5.1 MIG 2008:39  
The asylum applicants in this case were A and her two children B and C.  A 
had for several years been abused by her ex-husband. Both the police and her 
own family had refused to help her. She claimed that she risked being 
persecuted by her ex-husband and killed by her own and her ex-husbands 
families if returned to Albania.         
 
The Swedish Migration Board rejected their applications. Although the Board 
admitted that domestic violence was common in the northern parts of Albania, 
where the applicants came from, the abuses and threats that A had been 
subjected to were considered as criminal actions that had been performed by 
individuals and which had not been sanctioned by the authorities in Albania. 
The Board further considered it to be possible for A, B and C to seek 
protection from the claimed abuses in other parts of Albania.  
 
The Migration Court ruled in favor of the claimants appeal and granted A 
refugee status. The Court found that A had proven it to be probable that she 
had been subjected to serious abuses by her ex-husband in Albania and that 
she, due to cultural and social structures in Albania, could not obtain 
protection by the authorities. Against this background, the Court ruled that A 
had a well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of kön. Contrary to 
the Migration Board, the Court did not believe that A had any possible 
internal flight alternatives in Albania 
 
The Migration Court of Appeal also found that A had shown that she had a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of kön. The authorities, in 
form of the police, had according to the Court been unwilling to offer A 
protection against her husband. With reference to the country of origin 
information, the Court held that the Albanian society is “strongly patriarchal”, 
especially in the rural areas and particularly in the northern parts of the 
country. The information also showed that domestic violence is very common 
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and a serious problem in Albania and that it is rarely reported or prosecuted. 
The Court concluded that the unwillingness of the authorities to protect A was 
due to the social and cultural structures in the society and the fact that A was 
a woman. However, the claimants were not granted protection in Sweden, 
since the Migration Court of Appeal found that there existed an internal flight 
option for them in Albania.             
    
5.2 MIG 2011:6 
The applicants in this case were A and B who were Kurds from Iraq. They 
were a couple and claimed that they risked being persecuted by B:s father and 
family due to that they had an extramarital relationship. A had proposed six 
times to B, but he had been rejected every time since B was promised to her 
cousin. B:s father and family had threatened to kill them if B refused to marry 
her cousin. A had been shot at one time and A:s father had also received 
threats. The couple had been hiding from B:s family for a year. They had not 
been willing to seek protection at the authorities since B:s father held a high 
position at the ministry of defence and belonged to a powerful clan.  
 
Their applications were rejected by the Migration Board. According to the 
Board, they had not proved their identities to a sufficient level and their stories 
were considered to be vague, undetailed and not credible. The Board also 
stressed that protection against B:s family must primarily be provided by the 
authorities in the Kurdistan Regional Government Area of Iraq, which was 
considered to be possible according to the country of origin information. 
 
At the Migration Court, the lay judges overruled the presiding judge and 
granted A and B permanent residence permit, not as refugees but as persons 
in need of subsidiary protection.361 The lay judges considered the couple’s 
stories to be credible and that it could not be expected to exist efficient 
protection against honour-related persecution in the Kurdistan Regional 
Government Area of Iraq.   
 
The Migration Court of Appeal agreed with the Migration Board and the 
Migration Court in the sense that neither A or B were considered to have 
raised such grounds that they could be considered as refugees. No further 
explanations why it did not consider the couple to be eligible for refugee 
status was given. The Court finally concluded that they qualified for 
subsidiary protection. 
 
5.3 MIG 2011:8 
A was from Bureo in Somaliland and her family belonged to a religious clan. 
Her parents were divorced and she had been raised by her mother. Her father 
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was a teacher at a Koran school and she had two half-brothers on her father’s 
side. A had two children with a man she once was married to. After her 
husband died, she met another man and the two of them decided to get 
married. The couple had sexual relations before marriage and A got pregnant 
and had a daughter. When her fiancé found out about this, he left her and said 
that he did not want to see their daughter. Her male relatives said that she had 
brought shame to the family. One of her half-brothers tried to kill her by 
stabbing her with a knife after he had heard that she had given birth to a 
daughter outside of marriage. Her half-brother was taken to the police but 
they let him go after they found out the reason for his actions. Her mother and 
aunt brought her to her aunt in Kismayo. She was treated at the hospital in 
Kismayo for her injuries. Shortly thereafter, she was taken to Halima Adde, 
a village outside of Kismayo, since she did not feel safe in Kismayo. In 2009, 
her aunt in Kismayo told her that her half-brothers and her dead husband’s 
brother together with Al-Shabaab had come to Kismayo to look for her and 
they wanted to punish her for committing a crime against Sharia law. They 
had forced her aunt to tell them where she was by arresting her daughter.  
 
The Migration Board rejected A:s application since it considered her story to 
be unclear and it questioned what she had said about her stay in Kismayo and 
Halima Adde. The Board did not find it probable that it was not until 2009 
that her family had come to look for her. The Board also noted that the 
claimed threats were second-hand information.  
 
The Migration Court rejected A:s appeal of the Migration Board’s decision. 
The Court found it to be probable that A had a daughter outside of marriage 
and that she for this reason had been stabbed and therefore had fled to Halima 
Adde. The Court noted, however, that nothing had happened to her since 2002 
and that she had not met any of her persecutors since then. Her claim that she 
had been sought in Kimayo was only second-hand information. She had not 
given any reasonable explanation to why they came to look for her in 2009, 
even though they already knew in 2002 that she had an aunt in Kimayo. The 
Court concluded that A had not proven it to be probable that there still existed 
any concrete and current threats against her. She had against this background 
not made it probable that she had a well-founded fear of being persecuted.  
 
The Migration Court of Appeal considered that A had made her story credible 
and probable and that her claim for refugee status therefore could be assessed 
against these facts. The Court then stated, with no further explanation, that 
the relevant persecution ground in this case was “persecution on grounds of 
kön”. The Court found it to be probable that A had a well-founded fear of 
being persecuted by her male relatives and Al-Shabaab if returned to the 
Kismayo area, since she, as a woman, had not followed the prevailing norms. 
Since Al-Shabaab were in control of southern Somaliland, her chances to gain 
effective protection there were considered to be non-existing or very low. 
Against this background, the Court concluded that she had fulfilled her 
burden of proof and was to be considered a refugee on grounds of kön. The 
Court did not consider that A had any internal flight possibilities, since her 
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male network in the area where the security situation was acceptable were 
also her persecutors.   
 
5.4 MIG 2012:12 
The asylum applicants were three sisters, A, B and C, who by the time for the 
application were 11, 10 and 3 years old. The girls claimed that they had a 
well-founded fear of being subjected to FGM if returned to their home 
country Somalia. FGM was practiced in their family and it had come to the 
attention of Al-Shabaab, amongst others, that the girls were not yet 
circumcised. The pressure on the girls was rising as they got older, and their 
possibilities to obtain protection had been reduced in relation to reasons 
connected to certain activities of the applicants’ father.362   
 
The Migration Board decided that the applicants A, B and C qualified for 
subsidiary protection, but not refugee status. In its reasoning, the Board 
claimed that it was not probable that there were any threats from Al-Shabaab 
as regards FGM.   
 
The Board’s decision was overturned by the Migration Court, which granted 
the girls refugee status. In its reasoning, the Court referred to the country of 
origin information, which stated that nearly 98 % of the female population in 
Somalia is circumcised. The procedure if often performed when the girls are 
between four to eleven years old and the parents’ possibilities to protect their 
daughters against FGM are limited since the female relatives make sure to 
carry out the procedure when the parents cannot see their daughters. The 
Court held that the girls were at the age when the procedure normally is 
performed and the fact that their mother had managed to protect them for this 
long did not mean that they were not at risk of being subjected to FGM in the 
future. Against this background, the applicants were considered to be at risk 
of “gender-related persecution” in form of FGM if returned to Somalia.  
 
The Migration Court of Appeal agreed with the Migration Court and decided 
that the applicants were to be considered as refugees. According to the Court, 
the applicants’ parents had presented a cohesive and unchanged story and it 
was considered to be plausible that the pressure came, not only from Al-
Shabaab, but also from relatives and others. The parents had given reasonable 
explanations to why the mother and the daughters were forced to flee in order 
to escape the procedure. The Court also believed that the parents had made it 
plausible that they would not be able to protect their daughters if returned to 
Somalia.  
 
 
                                                 
362 The father’s activities were not further specified in the case.  
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5.5 Correspondance between the judicial 
application and the Swedish Aliens Act 
approach and to the 1951 Convention 
approach and the obligations of the 
CEDAW Committee  
In the cases above, all of the applicants have claimed that they are at risk of 
being subjected to different types of gender-related persecution. In the 
Court’s reasoning, we have seen that it does not mention the meaning and 
potential relevance of other persecution grounds than “membership of a 
particular social group” in these cases. Instead, the Court has only stated 
whether the applicants can be considered to be persecuted on grounds of kön 
or not, except for in MIG 2011:6 where the Court concluded that the 
applicants had not raised such grounds that they could be considered as 
refugees. It appears thus as if the Migration Court of Appeal interprets the 
wording of the refugee definition as if kön may only be considered under the 
ground “membership of a particular social group” and fails to perform a 
gender-sensitive interpretation of the other grounds.  
 
Considering the statements of the legislator, which were presented in the 
previous chapter, it is evident that the Court’s application of the law is not 
completely in accordance with the legislator’s intentions. The Court does 
acknowledge that kön can be considered under “membership of a particular 
social group”. However, as mentioned before, the legislator emphasised that 
kön can be considered under all of the persecution grounds363 and that they 
all should be analysed, in no particular order, when an applicant claims that 
he or she is at risk of persecution for reasons of kön.364 
 
Moving on to the statements of the UNHCR, which the Swedish legislator 
expressed that the Swedish authorities should follow365, it can also be claimed 
that the approach of the Migration Court of Appeal cannot be said to follow 
international law. The UNHCR has expressed that all of the persecution 
grounds may encompass gender-related persecution, if properly interpreted. 
These statements are also echoed in the obligations under CEDAW which 
have been identified by the CEDAW Committee.  
 
Hence, the case law of the Migration Court of Appeal is partly in accordance 
with the approaches of the Swedish legislator, the UNHCR and the CEDAW 
Committee since it recognizes that kön may be considered under 
“membership of a particular social group”. However, the approach of the 
Migration Court of Appeal significantly deviates from the approaches of the 
Swedish legislator, the UNHCR, the CEDAW Committee since it does not 
                                                 
363 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 34.  
364 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 27.   
365 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 20.  
 75 
consider each of the persecution grounds in a gender-sensitive manner in 
cases where an applicant claims gender-related persecution. 
 
5.6 Feminist analysis of the gender-
sensitive interpretation of the persecution 
grounds of the Migration Court of Appeal  
It is evident from the cases that the Migration Court of Appeal prefers to apply 
the persecution ground “membership of a particular social group” in cases 
involving gender-related persecution. This answers to the recommendations 
of the human rights approach, which argued that “membership of a particular 
social group” was the most appropriate persecution ground to apply on 
gender-related claims. The application of the refugee definition by the Court 
can thereby be criticised from an anti-essentialist perspective, since they 
believed that this type of interpretation and application of the persecution 
grounds sustains the stereotype that a “real” refugee is male. By applying 
persecution grounds that are “gendrified” to women’s asylum claims, it may 
imply that only men have political opinions, only men are activated by 
religion etc. This results in a division between “women’s asylum claims” 
against “normal asylum claims” and reinforces the view that the grounds that 
are not “gendrified” are reserved for male applicants.   
 
In sum, according to the critique of the anti-essentialists, the Court’s 
emphasising of the ground “membership of a particular social group” can 
sustain the stereotype that a “real” refugee is male, and women continues to 
be regarded as a deviation from this male norm in refugee law. 
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6 Concluding analysis  
This thesis has addressed three categories of research questions. In this 
chapter, I aim to summarise my results, category by category, and draw some 
final conclusions.    
 
Beginning with the first category, which concerned the legal examination of 
international and national law, I began by examining which the main elements 
of determining who qualifies as a refugee are. In chapter 2, we have seen that 
the refugee definition contains several complex criteria that a person has to 
fulfil in order to qualify as a refugee within the meaning of the 1951 
Convention. As mentioned above, the refugee definition was not designed to 
include all people that have fled their home; instead, its wording reveals how 
the contracting States wished to limit their responsibilities in the Convention. 
However, every asylum seeker is covered by the minimum protection in form 
of non-refoulement.  
 
The thesis has focused on the interpretation and application of the persecution 
grounds. In order to be granted refugee status, an applicant has to show that 
the persecution that he or she risks being subjected to if returned to his or her 
home country is linked to at least one of the persecution grounds: race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social 
group. If an applicant risks gender-related persecution, he or she needs to 
show that it can be considered to be covered by the scope of the established 
persecution grounds. This raises the question of how the persecution grounds 
encompass gender-related persecution.  
 
In chapter two, I analysed the 1951 Convention in order to answer the 
question of how the persecution grounds of the Convention encompass 
gender-related persecution. In its interpretation of the 1951 Convention, the 
UNHCR has established that the refugee definition already covers gender-
related persecution, if properly interpreted. This requires that all of the 
persecution grounds are interpreted in a gender-sensitive manner.  
 
The UNHCR established that persecution for reasons of race or nationality 
normally is not specific to either women or men. According to the UNHCR, 
gender-related persecution will mainly be assessed as persecution for reasons 
of religion, political opinion or membership of a particular social group.  
  
The persecution ground “religion” covers gender-related persecution, 
especially where “the religion assigns particular roles or behavioural codes to 
women and men respectively”.366 If a woman breaches the role that has been 
assigned to her, or refuses to follow the behavioural codes, she may be 
perceived as holding unacceptable religious opinions, regardless of what she 
actually believes about religion. We have also seen that a woman who refuses 
                                                 
366 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 25.  
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to wear the Islamic veil may be considered to “be persecuted on religious 
gender-related grounds”.367  
 
In gender-related claims, the persecution ground religion tends to overlap 
with the persecution ground political opinion, especially in cases where the 
applicant originates from a State where there is little separation between 
religious and State institutions.368 As mentioned earlier, political opinion 
should be interpreted in a broad sense “to incorporate any opinion on any 
matter in which the machinery of the State, government, society, or policy 
may be engaged”.369 Opinions as to gender roles, opposition to discrimination 
of women and “non-conformist behaviour which leads the persecutor to 
impute a political opinion” to the person in question fall within the scope of 
political opinion.370 Furthermore, when preforming a gender-sensitive 
interpretation of political opinion, it has to be taken into account that women 
often engage in low level political activities, such as providing food to 
combatants, and that they are frequently “attributed with political opinions of 
their family or male relatives”.371 We have also seen that a court in New 
Zealand has applied the persecution ground “political opinion” in a case 
where a woman had left her husband and for this reason was at risk of being 
subjected to honour related violence. However, there has been a reluctance to 
acknowledge persecution in the private sphere as political, especially 
concerning claims involving “domestic violence, forced marriage, resistance 
to female genital mutilation, and sexual violence” in State practice.372  
 
Although gender-related persecution can fall within the ambit of all the 
persecution ground, much emphasis has been given to “membership of a 
particular social group” in gender-related claims. 373 However, this is hardly 
surprising since the UNHCR has established that women may be considered 
as a social group within the meaning of the refugee definition.374 It has been 
identified that States parties to the Convention tend to narrow down these 
particular groups of women by adding more characteristics to the description 
of the group, which much likely is due to the fact that they wish to limit their 
responsibilities.   
 
Moving on to the third question in the first category, which concerned the 
obligations that States parties to CEDAW are bound to respect when 
interpreting and applying the persecution grounds of the 1951 Convention,  
we have seen that the CEDAW Committee has made several remarks on this 
issue. Firstly, States parties are obliged to ensure a gender-sensitive 
interpretation of all of the persecution grounds. Secondly, the States are 
encouraged to add an additional persecution ground, such as gender or sex, to 
                                                 
367 Zimmermann & Mahler 2011, p. 417.  
368 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 26.  
369 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 32. 
370 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 32.  
371 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 33; Hathaway & Foster, p. 411. 
372 Hathaway & Foster 2014, p. 422.  
373 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution No. 1, para. 28; Zimmermann & 
Mahler 2011, p. 416.  
374 UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, para. 30. 
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their national legislations. Thirdly, States parties should ensure that gender 
can be used as a factor in recognizing membership of a particular social 
group.375 Lastly, the CEDAW Committee established that States parties are 
obliged under article 5 of CEDAW “to assess women’s claims to asylum 
without prejudices and stereotyped notions of women that are based on the 
inferiority or superiority of either sexes”.376       
 
I now turn to the Swedish refugee legislation. Sweden is State party to the 
1951 Convention and thereby legally bound to respect its provisions. The 
Swedish legislator explicitly states in the preparatory works that Swedish 
authorities should use the Handbook and Guidelines of the UNHCR in their 
interpretation of the refugee definition.377 Consequently, the interpretation of 
the persecution grounds in the Swedish Aliens Act is much in accordance 
with the interpretation of the UNHCR. Concerning how the persecution 
grounds may be interpreted to encompass gender-related persecution, the 
legislator echoed the statements of the UNHCR, which I presented above, in 
the preparatory works.378    
 
Now, I will address the question of the legal meaning and coverage of the 
term “persecution on grounds of kön”. The term kön is stated in the Swedish 
refugee definition as an example of what can constitute a social group within 
the meaning of the refugee definition. As a result, the Swedish interpretation 
of “membership of a particular social group” is in accordance with the 
international interpretation of this persecution ground. The legislator even 
expressed that the amendment of the refugee definition was aimed to be a 
codification of the Guidelines of the UNHCR about the ground “membership 
of a particular social group”.379   
 
According to the preparatory works, persecution on grounds of kön can be 
applied in cases where a female applicant risks persecution because she 
wishes to stay unmarried or to work. The social group may then consist of 
“people that due to their beliefs refuse to comply with the societal norms on 
gender roles and because of this are subjected to persecution”.380 
Furthermore, the legislator brought up that membership of a particular social 
group may be based on a combination of characteristics, such as gender 
identity in conjunction with the exercise of the right to decide if and with 
whom one wants to have a family, or the right not to be forced to submit to 
surgical procedures.381  
 
The inquiry provided a few examples of how the authorities should reason in 
the assessment of whether an applicant can be considered to belong to a social 
group within the meaning of the refugee definition. The examples of social 
                                                 
375 CEDAW General recommendation No. 32, para. 30.  
376 CEDAW General recommendation No. 32, para. 31.  
377 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 20 & 24. 
378 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 23 – 24.   
379 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 32. 
380 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 26, authors translation.   
381 Prop. 2005/06:6, p. 26.  
 79 
groups that were discussed were people subjected to discrimination, people 
at risk of being subjected to honour related violence, people at risk of being 
married against their will, people at risk of being subjected to FGM and 
victims of domestic violence.  
 
The reason why the term kön was introduced in the Aliens Act was that the 
government wanted to clarify  that the ground kön was moved from the gender 
provision concerning “persons otherwise in need of protection” to the refugee 
definition and that persons at risk of persecution on grounds of kön would 
qualify for refugee status. However, considering the case law of the Migration 
Court of Appeal, it appears as if the aim with the wording of the refuge 
definition has not been achieved.    
 
I will now examine how the Migration Court of Appeal has interpreted and 
applied “persecution on grounds of kön”. In the cases from the Migration 
Court of Appeal, which are presented above, the Court recognized that a 
woman who had been subjected to domestic violence and refused protection 
in her home country was considered to be persecuted on grounds of kön. 
Furthermore, a woman at risk of being subjected to honour related violence 
and three girls at risk of being subjected to FGM were as well considered to 
fall within the scope of this persecution ground.   
 
From a legal perspective, there are several shortcomings in the Court’s 
reasoning in these cases. First of all, the Court did not give a thorough 
explanation to why it considered “persecution on grounds of kön” to be the 
most relevant persecution ground. Instead, it stated whether it considered the 
ground to be applicable in the cases or not.  
 
Furthermore, the Court failed to contribute to the interpretation of the term 
“persecution for reasons of kön”. There are no attempts to clarify under what 
circumstances a person can be considered to be at risk of persecution on 
grounds of his or her kön in these cases, neither does the Court discuss or 
interpret the social concept of kön. As stated in the preparatory works, the 
Court is tasked to develop the meaning and interpretation of the term 
“persecution on grounds of kön”, but this has not been performed in a 
satisfactory manner.    
 
In MIG 2011:8, which involved honour related crimes, the Court 
acknowledged that the applicant could be considered to be at risk of 
persecution on grounds of her kön. However, motivating the applicability of 
“membership of a particular social group” by stating that the applicant is a 
woman who has departed from the norms is, in my view, not satisfactory. The 
Court should instead have taken the opportunity to clarify how it interprets 
the term “persecution on grounds of kön”. Moreover, it would have been 
relevant in this case to discuss how the persecution grounds religion and 
political opinion should be interpreted from a gender perspective and whether 
they could have been relevant to this case. This, since it is possible that the 
applicant was perceived as having a different political opinion or religious 
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belief when she decided to have a child outside of marriage and live 
independently.       
 
In MIG 2008:39, the Court could have taken the opportunity to discuss the 
political aspects of domestic violence and whether the applicant could have 
been considered to be persecuted on grounds of her political opinion. Since 
the applicant reported the abuses of her husband, it can be perceived as if she 
was exercising her human rights and showed resistance to the power 
structures and patriarchal society in Albania. If “political opinion” would 
have been applied instead of “membership of a particular social group”, it is 
possible that the Court would have concluded that there were no internal flight 
alternatives for her and her family in Albania. The Court can also be criticized 
for describing cases of domestic violence as individual criminal acts rather 
than as part of  a societal problem affecting many women .   
 
In MIG 2011:6, it is quite remarkable that the Court did not even discuss 
whether the couple could be considered to be at risk of persecution on grounds 
of kön. This case involved honour related violence and forced marriage, 
which both were brought up by the inquiry as examples of gender-related 
persecution which could fall within the scope of “persecution on grounds of 
kön“.382 
 
I now continue to the second category of research questions, which concerns 
the correspondence between different legal instruments and applications. I 
start by looking into the correspondence between the approach of the 1951 
Convention to encompass gender-related persecution and the obligations of 
the CEDAW Committee. According to the interpretation of the UNHCR, the 
refugee definition of the 1951 Convention already covers gender-related 
persecution, if properly interpreted, and it therefore does not consider that an 
additional persecution ground must be added to the refuge definition. In order 
to include gender-related persecution within the scope of the established 
persecution grounds, they must all be interpreted in a gender-sensitive 
manner. No particular persecution ground should thus be given priority and 
all of the persecution ground may be applicable on cases involving gender-
related persecution. Although membership of a particular social group may 
well be applied to cases where women risk gender-related persecution, the 
UNHCR has emphasised that the interpretation of this ground cannot render 
the other persecution grounds superfluous. These statements of the UNHCR 
are echoed in General recommendation no. 32 of the CEDAW Committee. 
States parties to CEDAW are obliged to interpret all of the persecution 
grounds in a gender-sensitive manner and they must consider gender within 
the social group ground.  
 
Similar to the UNHCR, the CEDAW Committee expresses a concern of the 
emphasis that has been given to “membership of a particular social group”. 
According to the Committee, a frequent application of this ground in gender-
related claims may reinforce “the stereotyped notions of women as dependent 
                                                 
382 SOU 2004:31 p. 123 – 125.   
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victims”.383 It is therefore clarified in General recommendation No. 32 that 
the States parties are obliged under article 5 of CEDAW to avoid this by 
assessing “women’s claims to asylum without prejudice and stereotyped 
notions of women that are based on the inferiority or superiority of either 
sex”.384 
 
However, the CEDAW Committee takes a step further and recommends the 
Contracting States to include an additional ground, such as gender or sex, into 
the national legislation. As mentioned earlier, this can be interpreted as if the 
Committee, in its interpretation of the persecution grounds, does not believe 
that the established grounds may encompass all types of gender-related 
persecution, Furthermore, it shows that the Committee is in favour of 
adopting special provisions for women.   
 
I now move on to the correspondence between the approach of the Swedish 
Aliens Act, the 1951 Convention approach and the obligations of the 
CEDAW Committee. As established earlier, the approach of the Swedish 
Aliens act to encompass gender-related persecution in the interpretation and 
application of the persecution grounds is in accordance with the approach of 
the 1951 Convention. It is stated in the preparatory works that all of the 
persecution grounds may encompass gender-related persecution385 and that 
they all should be considered, in no particular order, when an applicant claims 
that he or she risks gender-related persecution.386 In addition, the legislator 
echoed the statements of the UNHCR regarding how the persecution grounds 
should be interpreted in a gender-sensitive way.387  
 
The CEDAW Committee also advocated that each of the persecution grounds 
should be interpreted in a gender-sensitive manner and that gender could be 
considered under “membership of a particular social group”. The approach of 
the Swedish Aliens Act can therefore be considered to be in accordance with 
the obligations stated by the CEDAW Committee as well. However, the 
description of domestic violence in the preparatory works388 cannot be 
considered to fulfill the requirement established by the CEDAW Committee 
concerning that the authorities must take precautions to not “create standards 
that are based on preconceived notions of gender-based violence and 
persecution”.389   
  
I now turn to the last question in this category of research questions: is the 
approach to encompass gender-related persecution in the case law of the 
Migration Court of Appeal in accordance with the approach of the Swedish 
Aliens Act, the approach of the 1951 Convention and the obligations 
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384 General recommendation No. 32, para. 31.  
385 SOU 2004:31, p. 132.  
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identified by the CEDAW Committee? It is here we find the greatest 
discrepancy amongst the approaches.    
 
Although the preparatory works echo the statements of the UNHCR 
concerning that the State authorities must interpret each of the persecution 
grounds in a gender-sensitive manner in gender-related claims in order to 
conclude which is the most relevant in the case in question, the case law from 
the Migration Court of Appeal shows that it fails to follow these statements. 
Although other persecution grounds than “membership of a particular social 
group” could have been relevant in the cases, which I have mentioned above, 
the Court did not consider these grounds in its reasoning. Instead, it seems as 
if the Court interprets the wording of the refugee definition as if kön can only 
be considered in relation to “membership of a particular social group” and 
fails to perform a gender-sensitive interpretation of the other grounds.  Hence, 
the intention of the legislator has not been followed in the case law of the 
Migration Court of Appeal and the case law of the Court can therefore not be 
considered to be in accordance with the approaches of the Swedish Aliens 
Act and the UNHCR to encompass gender-related persecution and the 
obligations of the CEDAW Committee.   
 
Finally, the third category of research questions, regarding how the 
interpretations of the persecution grounds answer to and/or remain sensitive  
to the feminist critiques identified by Spijkerboer, will be addressed. In the 
chapters above, we have seen how the interpretation and application of the 
persecution grounds and the obligations of the CEDAW Committee have both 
answered to the feminist critiques, but also been sensitive to it, which is 
inevitable since these critics disagree with each other.    
 
First, I will address the question of how the interpretation of the persecution 
grounds of the 1951 Convention answers to and/or remains sensitive to the 
feminist critique identified by Spijkerboer. As already mentioned above, the 
interpretation of the 1951 Convention answers to the critique of the early 
critics, since it has been recognized that private sphere political activities can 
fall within the meaning of the persecution ground political opinion. This is 
sensitive to the critique of the human rights approach. They mean that this 
type of reasoning assume a “bifurcated version of society” which “roots 
women’s oppression in sexuality and private life, thereby disregarding 
oppression experienced in non-domestic circumstances”.390  
 
Furthermore, the fact that much emphasis has been given to the ground 
“membership of a particular social group” and that it has been recognized that 
women may be interpreted as constituting a social group answers to the 
recommendations of the human rights approach, which was in favour of 
applying this ground to gender-related claims.391 However, this can be 
criticized from an anti-essentialist perspective, since they meant that if all 
persecution of women is regarded as persecution because of gender and 
assessed under the social group ground, it may reinforce the view that only 
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men can be considered as “real refugees” and reproduce the distinction 
between “normal cases” versus “women’s cases”.392  Hence, women 
continues to be regarded as a deviation from the male norm in refugee law.  
 
We have also seen how there is a tendency in the interpretation of the 
persecution grounds to emphasise the cultural context refugee women come 
from. Furthermore, practices which women in non-Western countries are 
subjected to are especially highlighted. This type of interpretation implies that 
gender-related persecution is something that only occurs in the refugee 
producing non-Western countries. As a result, the Western refugee receiving 
States are presented as superior and as if gender-related persecution does not 
occur in the Western countries. This can be criticized from an anti-essentialist 
point of view, since they mean that this results in that women have to present 
themselves as vulnerable victims of “dysfunctional, exceptionally patriarchal 
cultures and states”393 and as “a cultural other”394 in order to be granted 
refugee status. They must fit in to the stereotypes that the refugee receiving 
states impose on them. According to the anti-essentialist, these arguments 
reproduce “the opposition of the West to the Rest”.395        
 
In the interpretation of the 1951 Convention, the UNHCR shows a scepticism 
of the emphasis that has been given to the persecution ground “membership 
of a particular social group” in gender-related claims, which is in line with 
the concerns of the anti-essentialists. Furthermore, the fact that the 
persecution ground political opinion has received more attention in State 
practice answers to anti-essentialist recommendations.  
 
Now, we turn to the question concerning how the obligations of the CEDAW 
Committee answer to and/or remain sensitive to the feminist critiques.  As I 
have stated above, the obligation to add sex and/or gender as persecution 
grounds into the national refugee definition is in accordance with the 
recommendations of the early critics. They were in favour of adding an 
additional ground to the refugee definition in order to  encompass the specific 
claims of refugee women. From an anti-essentialist perspective, this can be 
criticised since it may reinforce the view that the persecution grounds that are 
not “gendrified” are only applicable to men and that only men therefore are 
regarded as “real” refugees.  
 
The Committee has obliged the contracting States to ensure that gender can 
be used as a factor in recognizing a social group within the meaning of the 
refugee definition, which was the ground that the human rights approach 
preferred to be used on gender-related claims.   
 
The obligations of the CEDAW Committee also correspond to the concerns 
of postcolonial feminism and the anti-essentialists. The CEDAW Committee 
is critical of how women’s asylum claims are regularly classified under 
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“membership of a particular social group”. Against this background, the 
Committee makes it clear that the States parties are in fact legally obliged 
under article 5 of CEDAW “to assess women’s claims to asylum without 
prejudice and stereotyped notions of women that are based on the inferiority 
or superiority of either sex” and obliges them to “take precautions not to 
create standards that are based on preconceived notions of gender-based 
violence and persecution”.396  Against this background, it can be claimed that 
there is a movement towards a more anti-essentialist thinking in the CEDAW 
Committee.  
 
Now, moving along to the interpretation of the persecution grounds of the 
Swedish Aliens Act, we have seen how traditional, cultural and religious 
practices affecting women in developing countries and Third World countries 
were highlighted in the preparatory works.397 This answers to the human 
rights approach, which were in favour of emphasising the context, in 
particular the cultural context, where refugee women are subjected to 
persecution. However, as mentioned earlier, this type of reasoning can be 
criticised from an anti-essentialist perspective and from a postcolonial 
feminist perspective. By emphasising such examples of gender-related 
persecution in the interpretation of the persecution grounds, it implies that 
gender-related persecution only happens in the Third World and thereby 
demonises non-Western countries.   
 
Now finally, to the last research question in this category. The approach of 
the Migration Court of Appeal to apply membership of a particular social 
group in cases involving gender-related persecution answers to the human 
right approach which considered that it was the most appropriate persecution 
ground to apply on gender-related claims. However, this approach is sensitive 
to the anti-essentialists critique. The anti-essentialists meant that this type of 
interpretation and application of the persecution grounds sustains the 
stereotype that a “real” refugee is male since it reinforces the view that the 
grounds that are not “gendrified” are reserved for male applicants.   
 
To conclude, this thesis has shown how gender-related persecution of women 
can be considered within the scope of the persecution grounds. I have looked 
at what the approaches of two international instances and the approaches of 
the Swedish law and judicial application to encompass gender-related 
persecution have in common. We have seen that the greatest discrepancy is 
found in Swedish judicial application, since the Migration Court of Appeal 
only considers the ground “membership of a particular social group” and does 
not bring up the potential relevance of the other persecution grounds in cases 
involving gender-related persecution. As regards the feminist analysis of the 
interpretation and application of the persecution grounds, we have seen that 
the instruments mostly answer to the concerns and recommendations of the 
human rights approach. However, the emphasis that has been given to the 
ground “membership of a particular social group” in gender-related claims 
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397 SOU 2004:31, p. 121 – 125.   
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has more and more been recognised as being problematic, which indicates 
that there is a movement towards the anti-essentialist critique.    
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7 Concluding Reflections  
This thesis has examined what is at stake for refugee women, depending on 
how the law is interpreted, justified and applied. From a short term 
perspective, it could be considered to be effective to apply the human rights 
approach. By emphasizing for instance how women who refuse to wear the 
Islamic veil may risk being subjected to persecution and applying the 
persecution ground “membership of a particular social group” to such cases, 
it may facilitate short term opportunities for women from such States where 
this type of persecution is performed to be granted refugee status.  
 
However, this type of reasoning may affect women’s long term opportunities 
of gaining refugee status. If only “membership of a particular social group” 
is applied to cases where women risk gender-related persecution, it hinders 
the development of the interpretation of the other persecution grounds and 
thereby limits the scope of the refugee definition. Furthermore, by using this 
type of interpretation, which demonises the countries refugee women come 
from, it results in that women asylum seekers must present themselves as 
powerless victims of “barbaric cultures” and fit into the stereotypes that the 
refugee receiving States impose on them. This approach can be found in MIG 
2012:12, were it was discussed whether the applicants could be considered to 
be at risk of persecution since the parents had been able to protect them from 
FGM so far. Hence, the applicants must present themselves as completely 
defenceless when this type of reasoning is applied. The problem this creates 
is, as explained by Freedman, “that it fixes an opposition between ‘them’ and 
‘us’, between ‘Western women’ and ‘Other women’, which might obscure 
the real structures of gender inequalities in different societies and the reasons 
for the persecutions that women suffer as a result”.398 It should be noted that 
persecution of women happens in every country in the world, and not only 
the countries refugee women come from. In the words of Catharine 
MacKinnon: “[t]here is no state we can point to and say, ‘This state 
effectively guarantees women's human rights. There we are free and 
equal’.”399  
 
                                                 
398 Freedman 2012, p. 56.  
399 MacKinnon 1994, p. 15.  
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